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Chapter 1
Introduction
The relationship between employer and employee is the subject of this thesis.
Both sides of this partnership make decisions that have an influence on the
production outcome as well as on their contract partner. An employer offers
a work contract that consists of certain details, such as remuneration, working
hours, output aims, duration of the contract and so on. The employee’s decision
depends on the details of the contract as well as on his given abilities, his educa-
tion and his attitude towards work, towards this special job or the employer. If
they expect to interact repeatedly, other factors like reputation building or trust
and reciprocity can also influence behavior. The theoretical models laid out in
this thesis, in combination with the experiments that study the same or similar
phenomena, examine different parts of this bilateral relationship.
Traditionally, workers are assumed to be heterogenous regarding their qual-
ification, in Chapter 2, we look at an additional, a special dimension of worker
heterogeneity: In a labor market experiment with both sides represented by par-
ticipants, workers decide themselves about their work effort in a real-effort task.
Because both participants’ payoffs only depend on the contract they conclude
and are independent of the worker’s actual effort, we interpret exerted effort as
a consequence of intrinsic motivation. Up to date there are only experiments
on the existence of intrinsic work motivation where the worker does not have a
contract partner who is represented by an employer-participant offering a work
contract. We expect workers to behave differently, when they do not just interact
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with the experimenter, but with a participant in the role of an employer.
A theoretical model of screening on intrinsic work motivation under endoge-
nous and observable qualification choice is laid out in Chapter 3, first with
continuous, then under a two-point distribution of intrinsic motivation. Here,
the multiply defined term “intrinsic motivation” from psychology is transferred
into the worker’s utility function and a new selection problem arises as only
qualification but not intrinsic motivation is observable to an employer.
Then we turn to long-term contracting under different degrees of contractual
flexibility as the topic of Chapter 4: In addition to fixing wage details, a con-
tract’s duration becomes contractible but now the worker chooses his work effort
after the contract is concluded. That means, the effort choice is not a part of
the contract. This leads to a different situation than in the screening problems
of Chapter 3: There is more room for reciprocal behavior between employer
and worker, as the worker has an additional decision to make after the contract
acceptance decision. With high wage flexibility inside an existing contract, em-
ployers are on the one hand able to react to changes in the labor market and on
the other hand they can punish low efforts of workers by lowering wages. In the
experiments of this chapter, we also want to examine whether the opportunity
to contract for more than one period is used or if participants prefer to choose
contract details anew each period.
The theoretical and experimental results bring workers’ decisions on educa-
tion and effort, the selection of workers by firms and long-term contracts into a
new light. The question “What is good work?” can be interpreted in different
ways: If an employer were asked, he would describe a worker doing a good job.
A worker’s answer might include the working atmosphere, job security, payment
and other characteristics of the ideal job.
This thesis shows how these different answers can be combined in contracts
that fulfill the expectations of both sides and that there is and also should
be sometimes more than just financial optimization in a relationship between
employer and worker.
Chapter 2
An Experiment On Work
Motivation
A worker’s skill level can influence production outcomes or at least production
cost. This is an empirically approved fact1 and is also explained in a series
of economic models. In psychology, another characteristic of the employee is
relevant: Work motivation over the years became an intensely researched field.
Work motivation has an effect on a worker’s attitude towards working and also
on his effort (see e.g. Deci and Ryan (1985), p. 294).
The relevance of work motivation for a worker’s behavior is acknowledged in
psychology and there are many experiments on intrinsic motivation. In those
experiments intrinsic motivation is taken as given and the experimenters test
the influence of different surroundings or changes in the payment structure. The
most widely developed type of experiments researches the influences of extrinsic
incentives on intrinsic motivation, where for example pay on performance or
goal-setting may have crowding effects.
To date, there are only a few experiments by economists, most of these also
on crowding-out of intrinsic motivation by giving extrinsic incentives. What is
missing, is a proof of existence of intrinsic work motivation, when participants
are not just the contractual partners of the experimenter but decide before they
produce (exert a real effort task) to accept a work contract offered by another
1See e.g. Chevalier, Harmon, Walker, and Zhu (2004).
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participant. Hence, our experiment is in a labor market setting with lump sum
payment. To avoid crowding-effects and to be able to identify intrinsic motiva-
tion, worker- and employer-participants’ payoff does not depend on the actual
working behavior of the worker-participant in the experiment. In the following
an introduction to the concept of intrinsic motivation is given and the experi-
mental literature is reviewed.
2.1 Different Views on Work Motivation
The following overview on the existing psychological theories on intrinsic mo-
tivation as well as on experiments by psychologists and economists is given to
explain under which circumstances such an experiment has to be conducted and
to show, why this experiment is a completely new approach.
Psychology tries to explain, which situations lead to higher or lower mo-
tivation and how motivation is influenced by working conditions. Economists
are interested in the effects of motivation on the production outcome and on
firms’ profits and hence sometimes these disciplines do not talk about the same
phenomenon when saying “intrinsic motivation”.
2.1.1 Intrinsic Motivation in Psychology
Rheinberg (2006) states, that motivational phenomena come as “an activating
focusing of the actual way of life to a positively valued target state.”2 The differ-
ent justifications of motivated behavior can be divided into intrinsic and extrinsic
motives. Woodworth (1918) was first to differentiate between an “activity run-
ning by its own drive” (p. 70) which is supposed to be intrinsically motivated,
and activities that are done to reach an (extrinsic) aim. Unfortunately, this
definition gives leeway to interpretation: Up to now there are several ways of
defining intrinsic motivation that are used by the psychological community and
there is no generally accepted theory, although all of them have common proper-
ties. To provide an insight into the discussion, we describe the most prominent
ways to define intrinsic motivation: Intrinsic motivation...
2p. 15, translation by author.
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... is what drives us during an enjoyable activity (Woodworth, 1918),
... follows from the need for self-determination and competence (Deci & Ryan,
1980),
... is another term for interest and involvement (Sansone & Smith, 2000),
... follows from agreement of means and ends (Shah & Kruglanski, 2000),
... can be described as goal orientation (Krapp, 1999).
The second way of differentiation was introduced by Deci and Ryan (1980).
They started their research into intrinsic motivation in experiments with school
children: The authors were interested in the effect of rewards (in their defini-
tion extrinsic motivation) on intrinsic motivation. The experiments were very
stylized and later on other researchers, e.g. Cameron and Pierce (1994), criti-
cized the missing applicability and transferability of results. The experiments
consisted of three stages: In the first stage children were watched painting pic-
tures (which all of them liked doing) and the time spent painting was recorded.
The second stage was like the first, but children were proposed a reward for
painting. Again painting-time was taken. At last they had to paint again but
without rewards. Deci and Ryan (1980) found that these children painted less
time in the post-payment part, than in the first and concluded that their intrin-
sic motivation to paint was “crowded out” by extrinsic motivation (rewards).
One argument against their conclusions is that participants get a reward for do-
ing a task they like. In a normal work context there is no need for additional
incentives in such a situation, as the worker already works at his maximum.
The authors defined intrinsic motivation as given by inherent needs for self-
determination and competence. Extrinsic motivation, in contrast, is resulting
from any kind of remuneration. With this publication, Deci and Ryan founded
Cognitive Evaluation Theory (CET), which was based on the persons’ percep-
tion of themselves (intrinsic) or an outside motive (extrinsic) as being the driving
force. They amplified their definition of intrinsic motivation in their book (1985)
to Self-Determination-Theory (SDT). According to SDT there is a need for so-
cial integration and taking over group standards. People want to identify with
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these standards and integrate them as their own. Although such standards come
from outside the person, they get integrated in such a way as to become intrinsic
motives.
Sansone and Smith (2000) took up a different stance on it and defined intrin-
sic motivation as interest. They described every activity which satisfies one’s in-
terest as intrinsically motivated. Kruglanski (1989), Shah and Kruglanski (2000),
and Heckhausen (1989) in contrast defined intrinsic motivation as leading to a
behavior with a direct relation of means and ends. Every activity that serves
for more than one aim is in their terms not intrinsically motivated.3 Activity,
aim of activity and the consequences have to belong to the same theme for being
intrinsically motivated. A student’s behavior is intrinsically motivated if she,
e.g, reads a text to solve a related problem afterwards. If she reads it to explain
it to her friend, Shah and Kruglanski (2000) speak of extrinsic motivation.
Another differentiation is by Nicholls (1984), who looked for an application
in educational psychology. He defined intrinsic motivation as orientation to
learn and extrinsic motivation as orientation towards performance. This view
of intrinsic motivation was extended by Krapp (1999), who included personal
development goals into his definition of intrinsic motivation.
Although there are five ways to describe intrinsic motivation, there is, un-
fortunately, no common base to the definitions that can be seen as the true
nature of it.4 To avoid confusion, the terms intrinsic and extrinsic motivation
are defined here as they will be used in this text:
Intrinsic Motivation is based on the enjoyment of the task itself and felt
during the process of the activity.
Extrinsic Motivation is motivation from any kind of reward or separable
aim that is followed by the activity.
These definitions can be derived from Thomas and Velthouse (1990). They
define intrinsic task motivation as intrinsic motivation dependent on a certain
individual task or project. This definition is also best suitable for a working place
or an experimental laboratory and is in the following called work motivation.
3Satisfying greed for money is not an aim in their sense, especially as it is hard to sate.
4Sansone and Harackiewicz (2000).
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A job or a real effort task is always limited to a certain area and in most cases
the attitude towards one task cannot be completely generalized to the general
working attitude of an individuum. According to Thomas and Velthouse (1990)
task assessment by the worker himself is the “proximal cause of intrinsic task
motivation and satisfaction”. This assessment is only influenced by the personal
preferences of the worker. These can also depend on factors outside the worker,
like opinions of friends, family, co-workers or society. Like personal preferences,
intrinsic motivation can change over time. This is reflecting part of SDT by Deci
and Ryan (1985), when people take over norms to belong to a community.
2.1.2 Economic Experimental Evidence
Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) tried to solve the discussion between economists
and psychologists on incentive pay. While the first claim, that increased incen-
tives lead to higher effort, the second found the opposite: the crowding-out of
motivation already mentioned. In a first series of experiments four treatments
were run with a real effort task of answering questions from an IQ-test. The
first group did only get a lump sum payment, in the second to fourth group each
correctly answered question was rewarded additionally. Group four got a higher
piece rate than the third group, and group two got a very low one. Gneezy and
Rustichini found that highest performance resulted in the treatment without
financial incentives, followed by three and four, and the fewest correct answers
were given in the treatment with a very low incentive pay. They complemented
their study with a field experiment: School children who collected money for a
good cause were rewarded in a similar vein: They got zero, one or ten percent of
their collection, paid by the experimenters. The lowest colleted sum was again
yielded by the 1%-group. Hence, the authors resume, that whenever you need to
pay per performance, better set out a high price as low incentives lead to worse
results than just lump sum payment.
Pokorny (2008) did sort of a follow-up experiment. She gave two different real
effort tasks to her participants: An intelligence test as Gneezy and Rustichini
did and the search for “ones” and “sevens” in blocks of random numbers. These
tasks were done under different degrees of incentive payment schemes (from none
CHAPTER 2. AN EXPERIMENT ON WORK MOTIVATION 8
to high). Pokorny found an inversely U-shaped relation between incentives and
effort, which contradicts the standard economic theory as well as motivation
crowding theories5, which would predict an increasing, respectively a U-shaped
interdependence. These experiments show that there is a widespread range of
results even in equal settings.
Falk, Ga¨chter, and Kova´cs (1999) compare partner and stranger treatments
of a gift-exchange game. Only in the partner treatments, they expect recip-
rocal behavior, but they observe this behavior under both matching protocols.
They name it intrinsic motivation to act reciprocally. This can only occur when
reciprocal behavior cannot be rewarded in the following interaction. Ga¨chter,
Kessler, and Ko¨nigstein (2006) look at intrinsic motivation. They call it volun-
tary cooperation, if actual work effort is higher than contractually enforceable,
and use a within-subjects design to test in a sequence of treatments how intrinsic
motivation is influenced by the payment scheme. When coming back from an
incentive scheme with bonuses or fines to lump sum payment, effort of agents
is lower than in the initial lump sum payment treatment. This effect is even
more pronounced, when agents are fined in the second part of the experiment.
Reciprocity, which in this experiment is the positive relation between payment
and effort, also diminishes after an experience of incentive pay.
Volunteering is sometimes seen as a signal for initiative at work. But if it
is taken as a signal, people would volunteer to show initiative, irrespective of
their real motivation (Katz & Rosenberg, 2005). As a consequence, the signal is
diluted. It is also questionable whether motivation to volunteer can be compared
to task motivation at the work place. Maybe the volunteer drew utility from
acknowledgement or from doing a social job. Hence, volunteering does not need
to be a signal of motivation. Also the empirical study by Frey and Goette (1999)
using data from the Swiss Labor Force Survey, supports this view. The findings
show that volunteering decreases, if financial rewards are offered. Even when
these are as indirectly as a tax benefit, overall hours volunteered fall. A reason
could be that volunteering cannot serve as a signal for intrinsic motivation any
more, although in most cases rewards do not cover expenses. This could also be
another example of payment crowding-out intrinsic motivation (to volunteer).
5Pokorny (2008), p. 253.
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2.2 Intrinsic Motivation in a Labor Market Ex-
periment
Opposite to different skill levels that can be reflected by different effort costs,
intrinsic motivation cannot just be put into the functional interdependencies of
a real-effort experiment. Intrinsic motivation has to be part of the results of an
experiment and not of its assumptions. Every form of “motivational parameter”
that is set by the experimenter can only induce extrinsic but not reflect intrinsic
motivation. In this experiment, the payoff function of the agents depends posi-
tively on the wage and negatively on the production cost to an agent. If he draws
further utility from the task itself (is intrinsically task motivated), depends on
the participant. That means we assume the degree of intrinsic motivation for our
task to be innate and brought to the experimental laboratory by the participants
themselves.
We want to look at task specific intrinsic motivation and its interdependence
with skill which is in our experiment chosen by the worker participants. Our
subjects first choose their skill level. Qualification cost are a fraction of their
contractual payoff. A higher skill level leads to a simplification of the real effort
task, which means there are fewer steps of production left to fulfill the task
than for a participant who did not invest and cost of producing one unit are
lower.6 We let them choose their skill-level to give them an additional degree of
self-determination in addition to having the possibility to just reject a contract
offer. This increases autonomy, which is one of the core job characteristics that
is necessary to induce high work motivation as stated by Hackman and Oldham
(1980).
As we need comparability between subjects, we chose a task such that all of
the subjects have the same ex ante chance to finish it. It is unrelated to specific
skills of participants. We also give direct feedback in showing the tasks’ solutions
to the participants, which is also demanded by Hackman and Oldham (1980) as a
basis for intrinsic motivation. To exclude that profit orientation has an influence
on the worker’s decision to exert effort and also on crowding effects on intrinsic
6This reflects the traditional way to model qualification: High-skilled workers have to bear
lower production cost than low-skilled workers.
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motivation, he and his employer are both paid according to the contract they
concluded irrespective of the worker’s effort.
In a second treatment, we are interested in the influence of social aspects on
intrinsic motivation. Some theoretical models (e.g. Besley and Ghatak (2005)
and Murdock (2002)) explain intrinsic motivation to be linked with (social) aims
of the firm the agent is employed at. There is a strand of literature about higher
than normal intrinsic motivation of workers in “jobs with a mission”, namely
any kind of voluntary job for some social organization. This kind of motivation
is described by Francois (2000) (p. 278). He terms this phenomenon “public ser-
vice motivation”. It exists if a worker is motivated by a certain social aim of the
organization he works for so that his incentive constraint is altered and his in-
centive compatible wage falls. Also Quinn and Staines (1979) found in their 1977
survey in the United States 49.6% of the respondents agreeing to the statement:
“What I do at work is more important to me than the money I earn.” In this
survey, members of the workforce in different occupations were asked, not only
workers in social jobs. Preston (1989) did an econometric analysis on the 1980
Survey of Job Characteristics (USA) and found a highly significant non-profit
wage differential of -18% for managers and professionals. This differential varies
in its significance when controlled for industry, job autonomy and flexibility but
remains negative and significant. These results support the author’s hypothesis
that employees of non-profit organizations donate part of their wage to the good
cause. That the effect is more significant for leading positions, results from a
more direct link of effort and organizational outcome.
Other economic experiments put their focus on crowding-out of intrinsic mo-
tivation under different incentive schemes and thus use a within subjects design,
whereas we compare the behavior of different participants in the same situation.
2.2.1 Experimental Design
The worker’s payoff depends on the contract he accepts and on his chosen skill-
level. If he rejects the contract that is offered by the employer, his payoff is zero.
A contract consists of a lump sum payment w and a production quantity q,
both are enforceable. Low-skilled workers have a cost of producing per quantity
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unit (QU) of 7 monetary units (MU), these are for high-skilled workers only 5
MU/QU. This leads to workers’ payoffs:
PL(w, q) = w − 7 · q;
PH(w, q) = w − 5 · q,
with superscripts L and H denoting low- and high-skilled workers. The princi-
pal’s payoff from a concluded contract is:
Π(w, q) = 20 · √q − w,
and zero, if the worker rejects the contract offer. As the workers in the exper-
iment have to fulfill a real effort task, it is reasonable to assume values that
correspond to the task. 7 MU/QU and 5 MU/QU are chosen as every final
product consists of 7 parts for low-skilled and 5 parts for high-skilled agents.
More detailed descriptions of the task can be found in section 2.2.2.
The setting of the experiment consists of two participants per session assigned
to the roles of worker and employer. Workers are low-skilled at the beginning
and then decide about becoming high-skilled or not. Education is costly and
becoming high-skilled leads to cost of 20% of the worker’s contractual payoff.
The employer offers a contract to the worker from a given menu of contracts.
The worker accepts or rejects the offered contract. If a contract is accepted,
the agent produces, i.e. he can work on the contracted number of tasks (q) or
wait until the given production time (7 minutes per q) elapses. In both cases,
he is paid according to the concluded contract, depending on his qualification
decision, qualification cost are subtracted. Hence, payoffs are not influenced by
the agent’s effort in production. Whether the worker fulfills this task has no
effect on his own or the principal’s income, but it is noted by the experimental
assistant.
In this setting a worker has no financial incentive to work. We tried to
model a job with lump sum payment and no control of effort. In reality one
will find very few jobs with absolutely no control or no possibility for a principal
to relate the outcome to the effort of his agent. But in most jobs there will be
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at least some part of outcome that cannot be related to effort. So, if a worker
actually “works” in this experiment, he will not be extrinsically motivated by his
payment structure but intrinsically motivated by himself or the task. We chose
to fix the time worker participants have to stay at the laboratory depending on
the accepted contract as in a normal working place the time a worker spends at
his job is the easiest to observe.
For both skill levels of the worker there is a given menu of four contracts from
which the employer chooses a contract to simplify the decision of the employer
and to make results of different sessions comparable. As the main focus of the
experiment lies on the worker’s behavior, this simplification is not seen as critical
for the experiment’s results. Table 2.1 lists the possible contract offers.
Table 2.1: Available Contracts in the Experiment
qualification of agent... contract (w; q) P Π
...low-skilled
N1 (8;1) 1 12.00
N2 (14;2) 0 14.28
N3 (23;3) 2 11.64
N4 (34;4) 6 6.00
...high-skilled
H1 (11;2) 1 17.28
H2 (19;3) 4 15.64
H3 (20;4) 0 20.00
H4 (35;5) 10 9.72
Only the bold entries are visible for the participants of the experiment. Dur-
ing the decision part of the experiment the participants can use a calculator on
the computer screen to calculate their own as well as their partner’s payoffs. As
this contract offer is not in the main focus of the experiment, we tried to make
up four different contracts per type with similar characteristics:
N2 & H3 These are the optimal contracts: Profit is maximal. Agents get
their outside option of zero and the principal keeps the whole profit.
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N1, N3, H1 & H2 Contracts that share the profit: Agents get less than
a principal. The principal’s gains lie between the extreme contracts.
N4 & H4 Nearly equal split: Contracts with highest payoff for agents and
lowest for principals.
With this selection of contracts the employer can choose what he wants to
offer to the worker and the behavior of agents with different payoffs can be
observed. The contracts are ordered by quantity. The range of quantities is the
same for both types but at different levels. We decided to do it this way because
the contracts we wanted to use do not differ much in their according lump sum
transfers and this could have led to some presumptions by the participants that
were not originally intended. We only gave the bold information to them and
did not give any labels like “equal split” to the contracts in order to prevent any
influence on the decisions.
The second treatment of the experiment (SOC, social) we conducted to test
whether there can be social intrinsic motivation in a laboratory situation of
this kind. Again, the payoffs of the principal and the agent do not depend on
the working effort of an agent but only on the concluded contract. In addition
to the rules described earlier, for every task that is completely solved by the
agent, the experimenter makes a contribution to a good cause, namely SOS
Kinderdorf e.V. It is active on behalf of the socially disadvantaged all over the
world, especially children.7 The agents are given an extra EUR 1.50 to put into
an original donation box of SOS Kinderdorf e.V. to guarantee that the amount
is actually donated. In this treatment we expect to observe even higher intrinsic
motivation, either in form of more participants working, a higher completion
rate or in accepting contracts with lower utility levels. Although the worker
again does not profit financially from fulfilling the task, he profits because he is
even more intrinsically motivated, which would support the empirical findings
already mentioned.
At the end of the experiment all participants are given a questionnaire about
7This organization was chosen because it is well known in Germany and there is no negative
press on it. In addition, it does not work for people with certain diseases so that some
participants could feel more or less in favor of it.
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their reception of the situation and in case of the “good cause” treatment, on
their opinion about SOS Kinderdorf e.V.
2.2.2 The Real Effort Task
A task for an experiment to study intrinsic motivation has to be interesting and
at the same time not too difficult, so that participants are able to solve it.
“The more interesting a task for the agents, the higher is their in-
trinsic motivation to perform well.” (Frey (1997b), p.431.)
It should also be hard enough so that it stays challenging over the whole run
of the experiment. Putting together the parts of a “Soma-Cube” was chosen for
the task. In Figure 2.1 there is an illustration of the seven parts of the puzzle.
As the interest will fall when a certain shape has been built once, participants
will be given different shapes that can be built with the parts of this puzzle. The
number of shapes to built is set by the contracted quantity. For every shape a
worker has seven minutes.
After seven minutes the worker is shown the solution and given a picture of
the new shape to build. Again, whether he finishes a shape or not, does not
change his or the employer’s income. The agent could also just wait until seven
minutes times the production quantity have passed and will be paid exactly the
same amount.
As already mentioned, the worker can decide whether to invest in “qualifi-
cation” or not: If he invests, some pieces are put together. The shape to build
will then only consist of five instead of seven pieces (cost per quantity unit falls
from 7 MU/QU to 5 MU/QU). The worker profits because it will be easier to
solve the task and he will save production costs as they depend on the pieces
necessary to put together a shape.
2.2.3 Experimental Procedure
The experiment took place in November 2007 at the University of Karlsruhe8
with 72 participants in 18 sessions per treatment. Participants were undergrad-
8The experiment was run by means of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft.
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Figure 2.1: Exemplary Soma-Shape
uate students of different subjects recruited randomly through our database of
potential participants. Only male participants were invited to avoid differences
with respect to interest in the task between men and women. The two partic-
ipants of each session were seated in different rooms, not meeting each other
beforehand. This was done to guarantee anonymity and avoid coordination be-
tween subjects. Also, we did not want the worker to feel controlled by the
employer during the production phase. Sessions took 30 minutes on average.
The length depended on the contract that was chosen, as there were given 7
minutes of production time per contracted piece of output. Participants in the
role of an employer were paid and could leave after the acceptance decision of
the worker-participant and after filling in a questionnaire. So there was no feed-
back on worker’s production to the employer. The workers also had to fill in a
questionnaire after the experiment. A translation of the questionnaire and the
instructions for a worker can be found in the Appendix (2.4.1 and 2.4.2). The
anonymous payoff was on average 6.18 (6.29) EUR for employers in the normal
(social) treatment and 10.11 (10.72) EUR was the respective average payoff to
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workers. Workers in the social treatment donated 48 EUR to SOS Kinderdorf
e.V.
2.2.4 Results
2.2.4.1 Workers’ Qualification Decisions
The qualification decision of workers in the experiment cannot lead to negative
payoffs: As qualification cost are a fraction of future payoff, they only decrease
their gain. If assumed that all available contracts are offered at the same prob-
ability, in both treatments workers should choose to become high-skilled as the
expected payoff is higher9. A low-skilled worker’s expected payoff is:
E[PL] = 0.25 · (1 + 2 + 0 + 6) = 2.25
The expected payoff for a high-skilled worker net of qualification cost is:
E[PH ] = 0.8 · 0.25 · (1 + 4 + 0 + 10) = 3
Hence, becoming high-skilled is in expectancy more profitable than staying low-
skilled. If workers decide in treatment SOC with respect to expected contract
quantities (more tasks to solve lead to more chances for donation), they should
also decide in favor of becoming high-skilled, as the maximum number of tasks
is five instead of four for low-skilled workers. The first hypotheses to test are:
H1A: Workers decide in favor of becoming high-skilled.
H0B: There is no difference in qualification between treatments.
83.3% of workers in treatment NORM (normal) and 77.8% in SOC decided
in favor of becoming high-skilled. There is no statistical significant difference
(Fisher exact test; P = 0.500) between treatments in qualification.
Results A and B The majority of workers in both treatments is
high-skilled. There is no significant difference between treatments.
Thus H1A is supported and H0B cannot be rejected.
9Compare Table 2.1 for payoffs from contracts.
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This reflects the results of an experiment by Shapira (1976), where partic-
ipants first chose from difficulty-ranked Soma-puzzles which one to solve, and
then made a preference-ranking of the remaining puzzles. In a treatment with
completion contingent payment, they chose the easier puzzles while in a treat-
ment with a lump sum payment (as in our experiment), participants chose higher
levels of difficulty. So workers in our experiment could also have been influenced
by the payment scheme and have chosen to become high-skilled, expecting more
challenging tasks.
2.2.4.2 Contract Offers and Acceptance
Profit maximizing employers offer contract N2 to a low-skilled and contract H3
to a high-skilled agent. These contracts contain the profit maximizing quantities
and leave workers with their outside option, which leads to maximum payoff for
employers:
H1C: Employers’ contract offers are N2 and H3.
To categorize contract offers for both skill levels, we labeled contracts ac-
cording to the (approximative) distribution of the pie (Π(w, q) + P (w, q)).
Division Contract high Contract low
100: 0 H3 N2
95: 5 H1 N1
80:20 H2 N3
50:50 H4 N4
There is no significant difference in contract offers between treatments (χ2-
test; χ˜2(df=3) = 0.917). In Figure 2.2 the distribution of contract offers is shown.
Most times, a 80:20 contract is offered, followed by 100:0 and for SOC 50:50.
Maybe the fear of rejection led employers to offer 80:20 more often than the
efficient contract with 100:0. The higher fraction of 50:50 offers in SOC could
be influenced by social commitment of employers, but there are two different
effects: On the one hand, an employer could expect his worker to accept less
generous offers than in NORM because of his attachment to the “good cause”,
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on the other hand, he could have chosen to offer the contract with maximal
quantity to yield high donations to SOS Kinderdorf e.V.
Figure 2.2: Contract Offers by Division of Pie in SOC and NORM
Result C Employers’ offers are not optimal. H1C is not supported.
Workers should accept every contract with a positive payoff as the contract
that gives them at least their initial endowment is combined with spending time
at the experimental laboratory and should (without any intrinsic motivation)
result in a lower utility than rejecting the contract. As there are contract rejec-
tions, it is checked whether only contracts with a positive payoff are accepted.
So the next hypothesis is:
H1D: Workers accept all contracts with positive payoff.
In Figure 2.3 accepted contracts are depicted with respect to the split of net
gains. Under 100:0 a higher percentage of contracts is accepted in SOC than in
NORM. This may be due to the workers commitment to the “good cause”, but
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Figure 2.3: Accepted Contracts by Division of Net Gain in SOC and NORM
the difference in accepted contracts is not significant (χ2-test; χ˜2(df=3) = 1.559).
If contracts with positive and zero payoff are compared, in NORM there is a
statistical significant difference at the 5%-level (Fisher exact test; P = 0.044).
In SOC there is no difference (Fisher exact test; P > 0.334). We interpret this
as an increased tendency to accept zero payoff contract offers, when a good cause
can be supported.
Result D In SOC workers’ contract acceptance does not depend on
the question whether the payoff is positive or zero. H1D cannot
be supported for treatment SOC but not for NORM.
2.2.4.3 Intrinsic Motivation
After comparing the rational benchmark with the experimental results, the main
focus of the experiment, workers’ intrinsic motivation, shall be analyzed. In this
experimental situation, there is no incentive for workers to actually produce:
They get their contractual fixed lump sum payment independent of their pro-
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duction behavior. So if participants in the role of a worker decide to produce,
they need to be intrinsically motivated.
H1E: There is intrinsic motivation in form of participants in the role
of a worker trying to solve the task.
As 100% of participants (all in SOC and NORM ) in the role of a worker actually
tried to solve the task, there is no need to test if there is intrinsic motivation.
As most of the worker-participants answered that they enjoyed the task (88.2%
in NORM and 83.3% in SOC ), emotions like curiosity, fun, and interest are also
explaining factors but as they do not result from any extrinsic incentives and
depend on the participant, they can be subsumed under intrinsic motivation.
The only extrinsic influence is the presence of a student assistant that handed
the new parts and wrote down, whether the participant worked (The writing
down was not announced to the participant.). According to social facilitation
theory (Zajonc, 1965) the presence of another person has a positive effect if the
task is simple and has a negative effect if the task is hard. As this task was
not too complex, the presence should have increased effort but cannot be held
responsible for the whole 100%. As this method is applied by most psychological
experiments on intrinsic motivation too, a possible bias is contained in all of these
studies and does not decrease comparability.
Result E.1 Workers in the experiment are intrinsically motivated.
According to (Murdock, 2002) intrinsic motivation of workers is even higher
when they work for a good cause, so in treatment SOC intrinsic motivation
is expected to be even higher than in NORM. But as already mentioned, the
production rate is 100% in both treatments and there cannot be any increase
from SOC to NORM. In fact, although they had fewer parts, the puzzles for the
high-skilled seemed more difficult than those of low-skilled: In NORM 61.1%
compared to 52.0% and in SOC 83.3% compared to 60.7% of the low, respec-
tively high-skilled workers’ puzzles were completed. The differences between
skill-levels and between treatments are, based on t-tests, insignificant. If one
goes back to Result D, there was a difference in contract acceptance in NORM
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with respect to workers’ payoff and no difference in SOC. This leads to the con-
clusion that workers in the social treatment accepted contracts irrespective of
their own payoff, to work for the good cause. So the increase in intrinsic motiva-
tion from NORM to SOC is not in working behavior but in contract acceptance.
Result E.2 There is no difference in working on the task between
the treatments. But higher intrinsic motivation is reflected by a
higher contract acceptance rate in treatment SOC.
Figure 2.4: Question 2, Worker
2.2.4.4 Questionnaire Data
After the experiment, both participants in each session filled in a questionnaire
with questions about the experimental situation. 88.2% (83.3%) of workers in
NORM (SOC ) enjoyed the task. Although neither their own nor the employers
payoff depended on production activities, 26.7% (38.9%) felt obliged to work
(Figure 2.4). This difference is not statistically significant (Fisher exact test;
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P = 0.387). As already argued, these numbers cannot account solely for the
high percentage of working participants.
Although Figure 2.5 seems to show a much higher rate of participants experi-
encing the task as rewarding in SOC, there is no statistical significant difference
between treatments (Fisher exact test; P = 0.088).
Figure 2.5: Question 3, Worker
Answers to the question “Describe your considerations in selecting your con-
tract offer.” that the employers were asked, can be divided into four categories:
(1) I considered only my own payoff. (2) I considered my own and the worker’s
payoff. (3) I considered my own, the worker’s and the payoff to SOS. (4) I con-
sidered only the worker’s payoff. In NORM the majority of 76.5% employers
answered (2), answers (3) and (4) were only given in SOC. Figure 2.6 shows the
distribution of employers’ answers for both treatments. The distributions do not
differ significantly (χ2-test; χ˜3 = 3.157).
88.2% of the employers in NORM expected their worker to produce. In SOC
only 77.8% believed in the motivation of their worker. The difference between
treatments is not significant (Fisher exact test; P = 0.50). With these answers,
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Figure 2.6: Question 1, Employer
employers state their expectancy of worker-participants’ intrinsic motivation. To
the question if they would produce themselves, 76.5% of employers in NORM
answered “yes” and in SOC even 83.3%.10 All of the participants in SOC knew
SOS Kinderdorf e.V. beforehand and 91.7% had a positive impression of their
work, the rest did not give an answer.
2.3 Conclusion
Experimental evidence for intrinsic motivation in a labor market setting with
lump sum payment is found. Participants were highly intrinsically motivated
such that they already worked at the maximum with low contract payoffs and
no social incentives. A difference in worker or employer behavior between
treatments cannot be stated since observed motivation was already maximal
in NORM. Workers’ contract acceptance in the social treatment did not depend
on their payoff in contrast to the normal treatment: In the situation without
10No statistically significant difference; Fisher exact test: P = 0.466.
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social incentives, workers differentiated between contract offers with positive or
zero payoffs. If they have the possibility to donate, the contract acceptance is
independent from their own payoff.
The experiments on intrinsic work motivation have a very clear result of
100% of the participants behaving motivated, as they try to solve a task without
being rewarded for it. What could have driven this result, is that participants
felt observed by the student assistant, who noted if they worked, such that they
could have done this because of moral obligation. In the already mentioned
studies by psychologists11, this is a quite common way to conduct motivation
experiments and even in the experiments of the critics, like Cameron and Pierce
(1994), this method is applied. Hence, if there is an influence of observation on
exerting effort, it is prevalent in all experiments on motivation and thus seems
to be considered negligible by the scientific community.
If we want to avoid the participants feeling observed, there is a measurement-
problem: Computerizing the task does not overcome the problem as participants
know that the experimenters log their entries. Sticking to a manual task and
using video cameras to control their behavior has the same effect, if participants
know about it and is illegal, if they do not. Self reports by players are not
trustworthy as these have the same effect of control. If there was a way to
collect participants’ agreement to be recorded during this actual experiment, we
could test the robustness of our results, but therefore we also needed a proof
that participants consider themselves as unobserved and this again raises new
problems.
Another reason for all participants working could be, that they wanted to
avoid boredom, as they were only allowed to leave the laboratory after the con-
tracted time (determined by units of output) elapsed. This was done to keep
comparability with a normal work situation of predetermined working hours. As
intrinsic motivation can only exist for an interesting task (see e.g. Deci and
Ryan (1985), p. 32f.; Deci (1971), p. 108), we did not choose something like
counting zeros in blocks of numbers. The task itself may also have led to such a
high number of working participants12, but actually, this is intrinsic motivation
11See Deci, Koestner, and Ryan (1999) for some examples.
1288.2% of workers in NORM and 83.3% in SOC answered in the post experiment question-
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itself and by using a dull task, we had excluded the possibility to show motivated
behavior from the first.
This experiment’s description and implementation shall serve as a first ex-
ample to do economic experiments on intrinsic work motivation. We wanted to
give a summary of psychological findings relevant for running motivation exper-
iments and show the problems, that need to be solved. Here, we tried to cope
with most of the challenges but could not manage all of them, which is mainly
due to legal restrictions.
naire that they enjoyed the task.
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2.4 Appendix
2.4.1 Instructions for a Worker
You are taking part in a decision experiment with two participants. During the
experiment you can earn money. How much you earn depends on your decisions
and on the decisions of the other participant. Every participant is seated in a
separate room. You were randomly given the role of a worker. You will stay
in this role for the whole experiment. There will be one interaction with the
participant that represents the employer. Your initial endowment is 5 monetary
units (GE).
Run of the Experiment
At the beginning the worker is low-skilled. He can invest in his qualification
and will be high-skilled afterwards. This comes at cost K. The worker can
produce units of output the cost of production is born by the worker. A low-
skilled worker incurs higher production cost per unit of output than a high-skilled
worker. As soon as the worker has made his qualification decision, this decision
is told to the employer. For each qualification level of the worker, the employer
can choose from four different contracts consisting of a lump sum transfer L and
a production quantity M . The employer decides which of the four contracts is
offered to the agent. The worker is informed about the contract and decides
about acceptance of the offered contract. An accepted contract is binding for
both sides. After accepting the worker produces according to the contract. He
puts together M figures from parts, with every figure representing a task. The
worker has 7 minutes for every task. If he cannot finish his task within this time,
the task is valued as complete (but not finished by hand). The solution to the
task is shown and he can start with the next task. Actually finished tasks result
in a donation to SOS Kinderdorf e.V. If the given time (M × 7 minutes) has
elapsed, the experiment is finished. Worker and employer are paid anonymously.
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Interaction
1. The worker decides about his qualification. Qualification costs are 20% of
his payoff from the future contract(K = 0, 2 ·EH). That means if EH = 0,
qualification costs K = 0. If he rejects the offered contract, qualification
cost is zero. The payoff from a contract to a high-skilled worker is:
EH = L− 5M
A low-skilled agent’s payoff from a contract is:
EL = L− 7M.
At the bottom of your computer screen there is a button to call a calculator
which you can open at every time during the experiment.
2. The employer is instructed about the worker’s qualification (high- or low-
skilled). His gain is:
Π = 20 ·
√
M − L.
The employer has four contracts (according to the worker’s qualification)
to choose his contract offer from.
qualification of agent... contract L M
...low-skilled
N1 8 1
N2 14 2
N3 23 3
N4 34 4
...high-skilled
H1 11 2
H2 19 3
H3 20 4
H4 35 5
3. The worker is instructed about the contract offer and accepts or rejects it.
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If the worker accepts the offer, the feasible quantity is produced according
to:
Production
On the computer screen you will see a task. This form was built from
parts. It is your task, to rebuild the form by hand. If you actually build
these forms is your personal decision.
If you are low-skilled you receive 7 parts, as a high-skilled worker you
get 5 parts, every piece in a different color. The number of tasks is the
contractually fixed M .
For every form you have 7 minutes. At the top of the computer screen the 7
minutes are counted down. If this time has elapsed, you are automatically
shown the solution of the task. To built the next form, you get new pieces.
By pressing “OK” the next task is shown and the next 7 minutes count
down.
Your and the employers payoff do not depend on trying to solve the task
or on just waiting until production time (7×M minutes) is over. For every
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task you have finished you get an extra EUR 1,50 to put into the donation
box of SOS Kinderdorf e.V. The experimenter decides whether the task is
finished or not. You can see the donation box next to you. It will be sent
to SOS Kinderdorf e.V. at the end of the experiments.
Example
You are high-skilled and accepted a contract with L = 60 and M = 10. You
finished 3 forms during production time. Your payoff is: EH = 60− 5 · 10 = 10.
Your qualification costs are K = 0, 2 · 10 = 2. Your payoff including the initial
endowment is: EH−K+5 = 10−2+5 = 13GE. As you finished 3 forms, you put
3 × EUR 1, 50 = EUR 4, 50, which you get in addition from the experimenter,
into the donation box. The employer gets: Π = 20
√
M − L = 20√10 − 60 ≈
3, 25GE.
Payment
You are paid at the end of the experiment. Payment is independent of the
number of actually built forms by the worker. Payment is determined only by
the accepted contract and the initial endowment. In case you invested in high
qualification, qualification costs are subtracted.
For every GE you get EUR 1,40. Payment is individually and anonymously.
Before the experiment starts, you will be asked some questions on the com-
puter screen about the rules. Please ask the experimenter, if you do not under-
stand any of the rules .
At the end of the experiment you get a questionnaire. Please fill it in and
leave it at your table.
2.4.2 Questionnaires
Worker
1. Did you enjoy the task itself?
2. Did you feel obliged to work?
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3. Is the task rewarding?
4. Did you know SOS Kinderdorf e.V. before the experiment?
5. In case you answered “yes”: Do you have a positive impression of the
organisation’s work?
Employer
1. Describe your considerations in selecting your contract offer.
2. Do you think the worker actually produces?
3. Would you produce in his place?
4. Did you know SOS Kinderdorf e.V. before the experiment?
5. In case you answered “yes”: Do you have a positive impression of the
organisation’s work?
Questions 4 and 5 to both roles were only asked after treatment SOC. Partici-
pants could mark “yes” or “no” and give further commentaries.
Chapter 3
Screening of Workers’ Motivation
under Endogenous Qualification
Although the relevance of work motivation for a worker’s behavior is acknowl-
edged in psychology, there are few economic models on work motivation. Like
other-regarding preferences or inequality aversion, work motivation is viewed
as a behavioral phenomenon that has only limited relevance for the big pic-
ture. What differentiates motivation from other factors is its direct influence
on a worker’s disutility of effort. That means, in contrast to outside-options
or reference wages, taking motivation into account does not only result in a re-
distribution of rents but production possibilities are amplified. As a motivated
worker performs better, firms’ profits are higher than with unmotivated workers.
Job advertisements for university graduates announce selection procedures
like assessment centers. This indicates that employers know that there is more
than certifiable qualification that influences a worker’s effort. That for some
disciplines final grades only vary a little and thus there is room for additional
differences between students, states a study from 2007 by the German Council
of Science and Humanities (Wissenschaftsrat, 2007). In the natural sciences and
also in Law and Sociology about 50% of graduates have the same grade. In
Figure 3.1 the percentages of the different grades are given. In Sociology 60% of
German graduates passed with “good”, in Physics and Biology about the same
percentage made “very good”, whereas 40% of Law students passed their exams
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with “satisfactory” and another 40% with “fair”.
Figure 3.1: Grades of University Degrees in 2005 in Germany1
If only qualification was relevant, and we assume that certificates are a good
approximation, why should employers invest into selection mechanisms? They
invest, because there are other characteristics of job candidates, besides qualifi-
cation, that are relevant. But even selection events cannot reveal a workers’ work
motivation for a certain job, thus, there needs to be found another mechanism
to give both contractual parties the opportunity to profit from it.
Both, motivation as well as qualification, determine the workers’ productiv-
ity, says Pinder (1984). Hence, employers need mechanisms for selection, that
also account for motivational differences. Pinder (1997) describes a coherence
between mental ability and work motivation and that both factors have a major
influence on a worker’s performance2. For example, higher intrinsic motivation
could lead to higher productivity. An agent who likes his job achieves new knowl-
edge easier. Motivation can even be a precondition for qualification. High-skilled
1Own diagram from data taken from the study of the German Council of Science and
Humanities.
2p. 20–22.
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workers normally do more challenging jobs, indicating a positive correlation be-
tween skills and intrinsic motivation. If skills are not seen as innate but stem
back to education, high-skilled people once decided to invest in training in their
field because they were/are interested in it. This could be another influencing
factor on intrinsic motivation at work. On the other hand, for some high-skilled
people, tasks might be too easy such that they get bored and accordingly have
a lower intrinsic motivation. As there is contradicting evidence on this interde-
pendence3, we abstract from it in theory.
In our model, workers are different with respect to qualification and work
motivation. As qualification is more or less observable through certificates, we
assume certainty about qualification but asymmetric information on motivation:
Motivation cannot be certified like a qualification outcome as it is specific to the
situation. From this it follows that a prospective employer does not know the
worker’s level of motivation at the signing of a contract. References from earlier
employers are also unable to reflect the whole picture.
Before turning to the theoretical model (Chapter 3.2) the economic literature
on work motivation will be reviewed.
3.1 Literature on Intrinsic Motivation
There are some publications that treat intrinsic motivation in an economic
model. Some change the agent’s utility function, others solve a matching prob-
lem, where the agent profits from working for a principal with the same ideolog-
ical aims. In both cases the agent draws utility not only from monetary income
but also from the task itself or some characteristics of it.
Be´nabou and Tirole (2003) analyze a framework with one principal and one
agent. The principal knows more about the task than the agent does and hence,
she knows better about the agent’s prospective cost of exerting effort. The agent
is offered a reward from the principal, if effort leads to success. This does not
only depend on the agent’s behavior but is also influenced by a draw of nature.
The higher the proposed reward, the higher the agent expects the cost of his own
3Pinder (1997), p.21.
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effort to be and the less likely he will accept the offered contract. This model
reflects the findings on motivation crowding-out of e.g. Deci and Ryan (1980) and
Frey (1997a): Workers’ willingness to accept falls with high wages. Kreps (1997)
also supports the crowding-out theory. He describes individual behavior as kind
of reversed revealed preferences: Individuals try to rationalize their behavior. If
they work without reward, they do it because of intrinsic motivation. But if they
are paid for the same task, they will attribute their effort to the extrinsic reward
and therefore feel less intrinsically motivated which will lead to a “distaste” for
the job.
Grepperud and Pedersen (2006) look at the crowding-out effects on intrinsic
motivation under performance pay and find a way to select agents with intrinsic
motivation from others: In a moral hazard model observable output depends on
effort and a random state of nature. Now the agent’s utility from a contract also
depends on the degree of performance pay. That means, varying performance pay
has a crowding-out effect on intrinsic motivation. In a situation with crowding-
out the authors find that the first-best situation cannot be reached, as the agent’s
effort falls under performance pay. This effect is stronger, the higher intrinsic
motivation. The optimal contract offer to an intrinsically motivated agent does
not include performance pay. Consequently, selection with regard to intrinsic
motivation results, when contracts with and without performance pay are offered
to a group of unequally motivated agents.
Besley and Ghatak (2005) describe a moral hazard model with three types
of agents and principals. One type of each role is just profit-oriented the others
are in addition interested in the mission of the business. Best match-quality is
reached when a principal-agent-pair sticks to one common mission. The optimal
contract contains a reservation wage and a bonus for the agent, with the bonus
increasing in the degree of the agent’s concession to the mission, that means to
compensate the agent for giving up his ideal, the principal pays a bonus. If the
principal has the possibility to choose the mission after employing the agent, she
trades off between following her own mission and reducing the bonus payment. In
contrast to the models by Be´nabou and Tirole (2003) or Grepperud and Pedersen
(2006), motivation depends on the organization the agent is employed at, which
is a kind of task-contingency, and there is no crowding-out effect by assumption.
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Also in Murdock (2002) agents have an intrinsic return from exerting certain
projects, but he changes the agent’s utility function and introduces intrinsic
motivation as linearly depending from effort. Agents have a higher utility when
they follow their preferred projects. Following that firms also follow negative-
profit projects: To reward an intrinsically motivated agent for doing profitable
projects, he is allowed to also follow projects with a negative profit but a positive
surplus, which is the sum of the project’s financial profit to the firm and the
agent’s intrinsic return. Murdock finds that implicit contracting is a complement
of intrinsic motivation.
James Jr. (2005) introduces a utlity function with extrinsic motivation (in-
centive pay) and intrinsic motivation as a function of effort. At the first stage the
principal offers a contract that the agent rejects or accepts, followed by choos-
ing effort at the next stage. Depending on the wage scheme, the agent will be
better off if he is not intrinsically motivated. Similar to Grepperud and Peder-
sen (2006), an intrinsically motivated agent profits from a lump sum wage while
an extrinsically motivated agent prefers performance pay. James Jr. concludes,
that the assumed combination of parameters in combination with incentive pay
crowds out intrinsic motivation.
The richest framework on work motivation is given by Bewley (1999). In
addition to conscious utility that depends on income and costs, he introduces
unconscious utility, which also takes into account the “mood” of a worker and
all possible kinds of non-extrinsic remuneration, like a nice working atmosphere
and also joy caused by work itself. Therefore “mood” is intrinsic motivation.
He finds that better mood can result in higher effort. Work moral consists in
his definition of mood and internalization of the firm’s objectives. Hence with
mood also firm profits increase, as profits are part of a worker’s utility, when his
moral obligation is high. The richness of this model offers opportunities to test
psychological findings, but does not give a hint on how to select the motivated
from the less motivated candidates.
The closest related economic publication on intrinsic motivation of agents is
Delfgaauw and Dur (2007). In contrast to the works already mentioned, agents’
intrinsic motivation is unknown to the principal and his utility from it is concave
in effort. The principal posts a job opening with a credible minimum wage. Then
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agents decide to apply/not apply at a certain cost and the principal learns the
motivational type of the applicants. The principal offers a wage to one of them
and the agent accepts or rejects. The offered wage has to be at least as high
as the announced minimum wage. At the first stage the principal wants to
sort with regard to motivation and sets a binding minimum wage. As there is a
tradeoff between keeping agents with low motivation from applying (setting a low
minimum wage) and risking a high proportion of low motivated agents applying
(setting a high minimum wage), the choice of the optimal minimum wage is
not straightforward. At first glance a high minimum wage seems preferable, as
motivation becomes observable after application, but as the minimum wage offer
is binding, the principal risks a higher than optimal wage to a low motivated
agent, if no better types apply. Hence the optimal minimum wage is set to
compensate the least motivated type, the principal wants to accept and meets
his outside option. All agents with lower motivation do not apply and better
types get a surplus over their cost of production and application.
These authors (Delfgaauw & Dur, 2008) also describe a situation in public
institutions with three types of agents. Lazy, normal and public service moti-
vated agents. Normal and lazy workers’ effort cost do not differ between private
firms and public service. Lazy workers, have highest cost of effort, no matter
what occupation. Motivated workers have lower effort costs than normal work-
ers only in public service occupations. If effort is observable but not the types,
there is a selction problem between motivated agents and the other types for
public institutions. The state provides a public good that is produced with a
certain level of effort and chooses how many workers and which type of worker it
employs. Of course public service motivated agents would be preferred, as their
effort costs are lowest. If there are not enough motivated agents in the popu-
lation, Delfgaauw and Dur (2008) assume that the state now chooses between
offering self-selecting contracts to motivated and normal, or to motivated and
lazy workers. As a lazy worker has the lowest outside option, a screening contract
between motivated and lazy workers incurs the lowest information rent to the
motivated agent. Hence, the state chooses to employ public service motivated
and lazy workers as a second best strategy, if the agents’ types are unobservable.
In contrast to the thesis at hand, workers on the one hand do not by themselves
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decide about their productivity type, which for unmotivated can be lazy or nor-
mal, thus there is no coordination problem between them. On the other hand,
workers can work at an alternative occupation, which is a firm in the private
sector. This simplifies the analysis because some separating contracts are not
offered as they lead to a non-positive gain to the firm in the public sector. In
addition they assume the second order conditions of the public sector’s selection
problem to be fulfilled. Here, it will be shown that this assumption is not always
justifiable and thus their analysis misses part of the solution.
A similar selection problem solve Handy and Katz (1998): In explaining
the wage differential of managers between for- and non-profit firms, they look
at a selection problem between high ability managers who are either devoted
to the non-profit’s aims or indifferent. The third type of managers is of low
ability. All characteristics of managers are given by nature. The skill-level is
represented by the predetermined output that a certain type produces: Highly
skilled produce more than low skilled and for non-profit firms highly skilled
and devoted produce more than their indifferent peers and these more than low
skilled managers. Managers also differ regarding their reservation wages. Highly
skilled have higher reservation wages than low skilled and for jobs at non-profit
firms devoted managers’ reservation wage lies in between. Firms offer a wage and
choose at random an applicant to test him for his ability. Although the result
is noisy, he will be employed, if he is highly skilled, if not, another candidate
will be randomly selected until a high-ability manager is found. Thus for for-
profit firms there is only a little uncertainty about a manager’s type. Non-profit
firms want to offer a wage that selects devoted managers from the high ability
ones. As their reservation wage is lower than that of high ability and indifferent
managers, non-profit firms try to choose wages that lead to a self selection of
devoted managers. In result, managers at non-profit firms get a lower financial
payoff than their peers in for-profit firms. This kind of self-sorting also increases
the surplus of the firm.
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3.2 Modeling Work Motivation
One of the basic economic assumptions is that all households are utility maxi-
mizers. A worker’s standard utility function depends positively on income and
negatively on work effort. So if he works more than he is compensated for,
his behavior is either not utility maximizing or the assumed utility function is
misspecified. If we want to keep the rationality assumption for intrinsically mo-
tivated workers, we need to redefine the utility function. It shall explain the
exerted effort as the optimal answer to the prevailing contract, such that the
agent’s behavior is not suboptimal any more. Thus, we introduce positive utility
that is drawn from work because of intrinsic motivation. This positive effect can-
not be linear because a feeling of work overload and routine decreases marginal
utility from work for higher effort levels, as the “principle of effort-calculation”4
by Meyer (1973) and Kukla (1972) states5. When describing intrinsic motivation,
we follow the theoretical model by Delfgaauw and Dur (2007).
As argued in the previous chapter, there are no clear signals for the in-
trinsic motivation of an agent. Motivation cannot be certified, which leads to
an information asymmetry between employee and employer; especially because
motivation is depending on the task. A recent study financed by the German
Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs6 found that there is a significant
correlation between firm profits and worker engagement (R2 = 0.31; Hauser,
Schubert, and Aicher (2008)). Therefore, employers want to employ motivated
workers to benefit from their motivation by paying less than they have to pay
to an unmotivated agent for the same job.
We want to combine these results to set up a theoretical model of intrinsically
motivated agents with endogenous qualification. Qualification can be proven by
certificates while only the distribution of motivated agents in the population is
known to principals7. As these prefer motivated agents, they try to overcome
this information asymmetry by offering a selecting menu of contracts.
4“Anstrengungskalkulationsprinzip”, translation by author.
5Cited following Rheinberg (2006).
6Bundesministerium fu¨r Arbeit und Soziales
7This assumption can be justified by employers’ experience with other employees or from
published surveys like those of Bewley (1995).
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3.2.1 Intrinsic Motivation under Heterogenous Qualifica-
tion
Every agent (worker) has an innate motivation for the only available job in
this world. He has certainty about his motivational return regarding the job.
In the utility function of a motivated agent, we introduce an element that is
increasing and concave in output, that means disutility due to effort is partly
offset by the worker’s satisfaction: He likes his job and therefore enjoys work.
With increasing effort, the marginal rate of the worker’s satisfaction or intrinsic
motivation decreases. This reflects the possibility of being over-worked.
Cost of production is assumed to depend on the agent’s qualification: The
higher skilled an agent is, the lower are his cost of producing one unit of output.
From a certain output level, intrinsic motivation is overcompensated by produc-
tion cost and utility falls with increasing output. There are two possible levels
of qualification namely high- and low-skilled. In the beginning, all agents are
low-skilled, but they can become high-skilled by deciding in favor of taking part
in costly training. Training costs depend on the agents’ wage. These training
costs come as an educational loan, which means: every agent has to pay a per-
centage of his wage after deciding in favor of a certain contract. Thus, he can
evade qualification costs if he does not accept a contract and the principal has
to take into account the agent’s qualification cost, when she offers a contract to
a high-skilled agent as these are not sunk.
This kind of educational loan is comparable to the German “Bundesausbil-
dungsfo¨rderungsgesetz”: Students get a loan from the state and have to repay
it in monthly rates that depend on their income after graduating.8 Education
costs in this model, can therefore be seen as the first period repayment without
depreciation.
Every principal is able to hire one agent. Principals and agents are matched
randomly one by one. There is only one match, i.e. if no contract is fixed between
a pair, there will not be a second chance for hiring/being hired for either side.
Although the agent bears the cost of production, the principal is interested in
knowing the agent’s type. A high-skilled produces the same quantity at a lower
8They only have to pay back half of it.
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wage than a low-skilled agent. The relation between an agent’s motivation and
the principal’s profit works the same way. The more motivated an agent is at
doing his job, the less the principal has to pay to compensate the agent for
production costs. As motivation cannot be measured, there is no possibility to
verify motivation ex ante. After taking part in training, workers can be identified
as high- or low-skilled. A principal only knows the distribution of motivation
in both skill groups, and hence tries to write contracts, combining a lump sum
transfer and a production quantity, to offer contracts that suit the different
motivational levels of the workers in “her” agent’s skill group. A lump-sum
transfer is especially suitable for motivated agents as any crowding effects on
intrinsic motivation (crowding-out and crowding-in) can be avoided. If workers
are paid depending on their performance, for example with a piece rate, this
effect needs to be taken into account.
3.2.2 Screening of Motivation with a Continuum of Types
Differences in workers’ motivation can be very small such that motivation can
be described by a continuous function, which we do in this section9. At the
same time this constitutes the most general case. Later on we will refine the
problem by assuming a two-point distribution of motivation with motivated and
unmotivated agents.
3.2.2.1 Agents
With q ≥ 0 as the production quantity and w ∈ IR as the transfer from a
principal to an agent being contractible and enforceable, there is no incentive
problem after the contract is concluded. The agent’s utility u(w, q) is a standard
function amplified by η(q) = η · qα, with η > 0 and α ∈ [0, 1]. It is a concave
and increasing function10 in the production quantity q and zero for q = 0. As
argued in Section 3.2.1, motivation increases with the quantity produced to a
decreasing degree. The additional influence in the utility function reflects an
agent’s motivational utility from working. The agent’s utility can be measured
9A game-theoretical description of this model is given in the Appendix (3.3.1).
10This terminus follows Delfgaauw and Dur (2007).
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in monetary units.
u(w, q) = w − θq + η · qα
The agent’s qualification or skill level is θ ∈ {θ, θ}. A high skill level results
from education, which is costly to the agent. When he decides to invest into his
skills, he has to bear costs κˆ ·w (κ ∈]0, 1[). That means, only κ ·w with κ = 1− κˆ
is left to him. His cost of producing one unit11 decreases from θ to θ, with θ < θ.
The level of qualification is assumed to be known to both, principal and agent,
as it is certifiable.
The variables influenced by the motivational type of an agent are w = w(η)
and q = q(η), because the menu of contracts offered to the agent will depend on
the distribution of motivational types. Motivation η is assumed to be distributed
within [η, η] with a density f(η) and the distribution function F (η). If we put
this information into the agent’s utility function, it becomes:
u[w(η), q(η)] = w(η)− θq(η) + η · [q(η)]α
If the agent does not work, his outside option is zero. In other words, there
are no subsidies and there is no possibility to work at another place. This
assumption is qualitatively not restrictive, as is laid out in Appendix 3.3.2.
3.2.2.2 The Principal
The principal’s profit depends on the amount of output that is produced and on
the transfer she has to pay to the agent:
E[Π[w(η), q(η)]] =
η∫
η
[ϕ[q(η)]α − w(η)] · f(η)dη
with ϕ > η > 0 and thus the principals profit ϕ[q(η)]α is increasing and concave
in q and zero for q = 0. ϕ is assumed to be larger than η as otherwise the
employer could sell the shop to the worker. The principal is assumed not to take
11θ refers to production cost. Hence, a high (skill) type has lower costs (θ) than a low (skill)
type (θ).
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the agent’s observable qualification as a signal for his motivational type but to
take the initial distribution F (η) as given for both skill-levels. As the principal
offers a set of contracts to the agent, she can decide about q and w. The principal
wants to profit from higher motivated agents’ lower wage needs and thus writes
incentive compatible contracts in the sense that agents choose the contract that
suits their motivational type.
As in later steps of analysis more general functions for the principal’s gain
and agent’s motivational utility become intractible, we decided in favour of solv-
ability, accepting a small loss in generality.
3.2.2.3 Sequence of Decisions
Principals and agents do not decide simultaneously, hence we give an overview
to the sequence of decisions in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: Sequence of Moves for Continuously Distributed Motivational Types
We work backward through the decisions to receive an incentive compatible
menu of contracts for each skill-level and the equilibrium qualification decision
of an agent. Under the assumption of observable skill types, the principal only
needs to separate between motivational types of given qualification. We will
do the analysis for high-skilled agents with skill-parameter θ and κ · w as the
remainder of the wage after paying qualification cost. For low-skilled agents at
the end θ will be replaced by θ and κ = 1 as they can keep the whole wage.
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3.2.2.3.1 The Principal’s Contract Offer As agents accept the utility
maximizing contract with respect to their motivational type, the principal maxi-
mizes her expected gain under the agents’ participation constraints and incentive
compatibility for all motivational types. To high-skilled agents the principal of-
fers a menu of contracts {w(η), q(η)} resulting from:
max
{w(η),q(η)}
E[Π[w(η), q(η)]]
subject to
u[w(η), q(η)] = κw(η)− θq(η) + η · [q(η)]α ≥ 0
κw(η)− θq(η) + η · [q(η)]α ≥ κw(ηˆ)− θq(ηˆ) + η · [q(ηˆ)]α
∀η, ηˆ ∈ [η, η], η 6= ηˆ
The side conditions are the agents’ participation and incentive compatibility
constraints12. The participation constraint will be fulfilled for all types if it
is fulfilled for the least motivated agent (η) and if the incentive compatibility
constraints are fulfilled, too. If all types are better off with their own, than with
a lower motivated type’s contract and the least motivated agent’s participation
constraint is fulfilled, their utility must exceed their outside-option and thus all
participation constraints are fulfilled. They can be reduced to the least motivated
type’s constraint:
κw(η)− θq(η) + η · [q(η)]α ≥ 0
The incentive compatibility constraints can be simplified by looking at the
acceptance behavior of the agents. Knowing, that an agent will accept the
contract, that gives him maximal utility given his own type η, the principal
chooses {w(η); q(η)} such that the agent reveals by his contract choice his real
motivational type. This is equal to an agent maximizing
max
ηˆ
κw(ηˆ)− θq(ηˆ) + η · [q(ηˆ)]α.
12Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) solve a similar problem for sellers and buyers, with buyers
differing in their valuation for the offered good.
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The agent chooses a contract, that depends on a certain level of motivation
ηˆ. He cannot choose his own motivation η as it is given by nature. The first
order condition of this problem results from derivation with respect to ηˆ:
κw′(ηˆ)− θq′(ηˆ) + η · α[q(ηˆ)]α−1q′(ηˆ) = 0
This equation gives an incentive compatible contract, whenever ηˆ = η, which
is, the agent chooses “his” contract and such reveals his motivational type:
κw′(η)− θq′(η) + η · α[q′(η)]α−1q′(η) = 0 (3.1)
For (3.1) to constitute the maximum of the agents’ utility, the second order
condition must be negative at η = ηˆ:
κw′′(ηˆ)− θq′′(ηˆ) + ηα(α− 1)[q(ηˆ)]α−2q′(ηˆ) + ηα[q(ηˆ)]α−1q′′(ηˆ) !< 0 (3.2)
As (3.1) has to hold for all η ∈ [η, η], it may not change for changing η, i.e.
its derivative, with respect to η is zero:
κw′′(η)− θq′′(η) + ηα(α− 1)[q(η)]α−2q′(η) + ηα[q(η)]α−1q′′(η)︸ ︷︷ ︸
LHS of (3.2)
+α[q(η)]α−1·dq(η)
dη
= 0
The negativity condition (3.2) is satisfied for dq(η)
dη
≥ 0 (monotonicity). From
this, the simplified maximization programme for the principal can be stated as:
max
{w(η),q(η)}
E[Π[w(η), q(η)]]
subject to
κw(η)− θq(η) + η · [q(η)]α ≥ 0
θq′(η)− ηα[q(η)]α−1q′(η) = κw′(η)
dq(η)
dη
≥ 0
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This maximization problem is solved without the monotonicity condition,
following the now standard procedure introduced by Mirrlees (1971), then the
result is checked for fulfilling the condition:
u(η) ≡ κw(η)− θq(η) + η · [q(η)]α
= max
ηˆ
{κw(ηˆ)− θq(ηˆ) + η · [q(ηˆ)]α} (3.3)
Making use of the envelope theorem to u(η) and expressing u(η) as an integral
we get a tractable function of η, so that w(η) can be replaced in the principal’s
yield function13:
∂u(η)
∂η
= [q(η)]α
u(η) =
η∫
η
[q(x)]αdx+ u(η)
=
η∫
η
[q(x)]αdx
The transfer from the principal to the agent can be replaced by
w(η) =
1
κ
η∫
η
[q(x)]αdx+ θq(η)− η[q(η)]α (3.4)
and the principal’s yield function becomes:
E[Π[q(η)]] =
η∫
η
(ϕ+ η
κ
) · [q(η)]α − θ
κ
· q(η)− 1
κ
η∫
η
[q(x)]αdx
 f(η)dη
13u(η) = 0 as the participation constraint of the lowest motivational type is binding at the
optimum.
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which can be simplified by partial integration to14:
E[Π[q(η)]] =
η∫
η
[
(ϕ+
η
κ
) · [q(η)]α − θ
κ
q(η)− 1
κh(η)
· [q(η)]α
]
f(η)dη (3.5)
Where (ϕ+ η
κ
) · [q(η)]α− θ
κ
q(η)]α is the first-best social surplus, 1
κh(η)
· [q(η)]α
is the impact of the incentive problem on the social surplus, and h(η) = f(η)
1−F (η) is
the hazard rate. To maximize E[Π[q(η)]] over q, we can maximize the integrand
of (3.5) by making use of the fundamental theorem of calculus (see e.g. Kaplan
(2003), p. 216). The condition for an optimal menu of contracts results and has
to be checked for monotonicity:
α · [q(η)]α−1
[
(ϕ+
η
κ
)− 1
κh(η)
]
− θ
κ
= 0 (3.6)
The change of q in η is monotonic, if the implicit differential of (3.6) is not
negative.
dq(η)
dη
∣∣∣∣∣ q = q∗ = α[q(η)]
α−1
(
1− h′(η)
[h(η)]2
)
1
κ
α(1− α)[q(η)]α−2 (3.7)
14
η∫
η
η∫
η
[q(x)]αdx · f(η)dη =
 η∫
η
[q(x)]αdx · F (η)

η
η
−
η∫
η
[q(η)]α · F (η)dη
=
η∫
η
[q(η)]αdη · F (η)−
η∫
η
[q(η)]αdη · F (η)−
η∫
η
[q(η)]αF (η)dη
=
η∫
η
[q(η)]αdη −
η∫
η
[q(η)]αF (η)dη
=
η∫
η
[q(η)]α[1− F (η)]dη.
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If motivation η is for example uniformly distributed, with
f(η) = fU(η) =
{
1
η−η ∀ η ∈ [η, η]
0 else
(3.7) becomes zero as the derivative of the inverse hazard rate
(
h′(η)
[h(η)]2
)
is unity.
The hazard rate is nondecreasing for the uniform, as well as for the normal and
the exponential distribution, and thus the monotonicity condition is fulfilled for
the most common distribution assumptions (see e.g. Bolton and Dewatripont
(2005), p.88).
Result 1: For continuous motivation the optimal menu of contracts
{w(η), q(η)} to a high-skilled agent is defined by:
q∗(η) =
(
ακ
θ
) 1
1−α
(
ϕ+
η
κ
− 1
κh(η)
) 1
1−α
and
w∗(η) =
1
κ
η∫
η
[q(x)]αdx+
θ
κ
q(η)− η
κ
[q(η)]α.
Agents reveal their motivational type by choosing the suitable con-
tract. For low-skilled agents θ has to be replaced by θ and κ = 1,
which yields:
q∗(η) =
(
α
θ
) 1
1−α
(
ϕ+ η − 1
h(η)
) 1
1−α
and
w∗(η) =
η∫
η
[q(x)]αdx+ θq(η)− η[q(η)]α.
Where we took the optimal wages from (3.4). The corresponding utilities for
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high- and low-skilled agents are
u∗(η) =
η∫
η
[q(x)]αdx and u∗(η) =
η∫
η
[q(x)]αdx.
As for the least motivated agents (η) the lower and upper boundary of the
integral coincide, these have zero utility from such a contract. The principal’s
expected profit from offering the suitable incentive compatible menu of contracts
regarding the agent’s skill-level is
E[Π(w(η), q(η))] =
(1− α)θ
ακ
η∫
η
[q∗(η)]f(η)dη
for contracting with a high-skilled and
E[Π(w(η), q(η))] =
(1− α)θ
α
η∫
η
[q∗(η)]f(η)dη
for contract offers to a low-skilled agent.
3.2.2.4 The Agents’ Qualification Decision
Now the agents’ qualification decisions as the first decision of the model are
looked at. Training costs are a tax on the wage w of κˆ = 1−κ. As they are paid
by the agent at the time he concludes a contract, the principal takes these into
account in the constraints to her maximization problem. Hence the high-skilled
agents’ utility is already net of qualification cost, which are not sunk. The prin-
cipal is assumed not to try to derive the actual distribution of motivation, which
results from the agents’ qualification decisions. To her the initial distribution of
motivation applies for both skill-levels.15 Taking this behavior of principals into
account, the equilibrium qualification decision depends on the combination of
qualification cost and the skill-parameters. If we compare an agent’s difference
15Compare the Appendix 3.3.1.
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in utilities of the two skill-levels, he is indifferent between becoming high-skilled
and remaining low-skilled for:
u∗(η) = u∗(η)
η∫
η
[
ακ
θ
(
ϕ+
x
κ
− 1
κh(x)
)] α
1−α
dx =
η∫
η
[
α
θ
(
ϕ+ x− 1
h(x)
)] α
1−α
dx
θ
α
1−α
η∫
η
(
κϕ+ x− 1
h(x)
) α
1−α
dx = θ
α
1−α
η∫
η
(
ϕ+ x− 1
h(x)
) α
1−α
dx
The value of the integral is larger for being low-skilled than for being high-
skilled and as θ > θ, both sides can be equal in size. Hence, there may be
combinations of κ, θ and θ that lead to an indifference between the two skill-
levels, but they cannot be stated without further assumptions to the variables.
Result 2: It depends on the combination of κ, θ and θ if qualifica-
tion pays off to the agents or not.
There are combinations of the exogenous variables that result in a positive
compared utility from becoming high-skilled. In the following example we want
to show that there exists a well behaved solution in the continuous case.
Numerical Example
The principal’s gain from every unit produced is determined by
Π(q) = 25
√
q. Agents motivation η is assumed to be uniformly
distributed within [0, 10] at both skill-levels and high (low) qual-
ification leads to cost per unit produced of θ = 1 (θ = 2). The
agents’ motivational utility is η
√
q and the qualification cost pa-
rameter is set at κ = 0.8 (i.e., the tax on the wage is κˆ = 0.2).
By plugging these values into the conditions for the second-best
optimum, we get for a low-skilled agent:
{q(η) ; w(η)} = {(3.75 + 0.5η)2 ; 14.0625 + (3.75 + 0.5η)2} ,
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and for a high-skilled agent:
{
q(η) ; w(η)
}
=
{
(5 + 0.5η)2 ; 31.25 + 6.25η
}
.
The agents’ utility is determined by: u(η) = 3.75η + 0.25η2 for
low-skilled and u(η) = 5η + 0.25η2 for high-skilled agents. Thus,
all agents at least weakly prefer becoming high-skilled as the dif-
ference in utilities is not negative.
With motivational screening, a principal’s expected profit is
E[Π(η)] = 125 if he employs a low-skilled agent and E[Π(η)] =
93.75 if he employs a high-skilled agent. That the expected profit
from contracting with a low-skilled agent is higher than from a
contract with his high-skilled peer, results from the fact that in
this example, with a low-skilled, intrinsic motivation has a higher
impact on profit than with a high-skilled agent. The base-profit
from contracting with a high-skilled type is higher than with a
low-skilled agent. Keep in mind, that the principal is able to
identify “his” agent’s skill-level, but he may not choose between
contracting with high- or low-skilled types.
In the next section the case of a two-point-distribution of motivation and
principals knowing the actual distributions of motivation for the two skill-types
is described, to see additional characteristics of selection on innate characterisitcs
under endogenous and observable qualification.
3.2.3 Screening with Motivated and Unmotivated Agents
In the following we analyze a situation with only two levels of motivation: mo-
tivated and unmotivated. An agent’s utility is the same as in the case with
continuously distributed types but the motivational parameter η is a given pa-
rameter and either 0 for unmotivated agents or positive for motivated agents.
Again, agents decide first about their productivity enhancing investment into
qualification16. An agent’s utility is:
16The game-theoretic setup of this model can be found in the Appendix (3.3.1).
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u(q, w) = κw − θq + ηqα (3.8)
Again, θ ∈ {θ, θ} reflects qualification. A high-skilled agent has invested into
qualification at cost κˆw = (1 − κ)w (κ ∈]0, 1[ and κ = 1 − κˆ). When an agent
decides to invest into his skills, his cost of producing one unit decreases from θ to
θ, with θ < θ. Thus, the parameter values of κ, θ and η depend on the respective
agent’s motivational type and the chosen skill-level. The following table gives
an overview over their values:
Table 3.1: Paramter values of the four possible agent types (η/κ/θ)
unmotivated motivated
low-skilled 0/1/θ η/1/θ
high-skilled 0/κ/θ η/κ/θ
If we insert those values into (3.8), the four possible types of agents have
utilities of
1. high-skilled and motivated: um = κw − θ · q + η · qα
2. low-skilled and motivated: um = w − θ · q + η · qα
3. high-skilled and unmotivated: u0 = κw − θ · q
4. low-skilled and unmotivated: u0 = w − θ · q.
The principal’s profit depends on the amount of output that is produced and
on the transfer she has to pay to the agent:
Π(q, w) = ϕ · qα − w
As the principal offers a set of contracts to the agent, she can decide about
q and w. A motivated agent has lower production costs than his equally skilled
peer. Knowing the agent’s qualification, the principal is interested in telling the
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two remaining motivational types from each other and writes incentive compat-
ible contracts in the sense that no type has an incentive to mimic another type.
As qualification is common knowledge, the two separating menus of contracts
divide the two motivational types each at one skill-level. It is assumed that in
the case of indifference between two contracts, the “right” contract is accepted,
that means the contract which enables the principal to a higher gain.
The sequence of moves is similar to that in the model with continuous moti-
vational types and illustrated in Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3: Sequence of Moves for Two Distinct Motivational Types
We solve this problem applying backward induction: At first the principal’s
selection problem is solved, which results in different utilities from contracts for
the different types of agents. As we assume agents to be non-atomic, that is,
their qualification decision has an influence on the fraction of unmotivated on
the high (p) and on the low (p) skill-level also from the principal’s view, the
contractual utilities depend on all agents’ qualification decisions. This leads to
a coordination problem between the agents, which will be analyzed after the
screening game.
In the next section, the optimal contract offer by the principal is derived for
observable and unobservable motivation. The case with full information shall
serve as a benchmark and will become useful in later steps of the analysis.
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3.2.3.1 The Optimal Menu of Contracts
The principal’s problem is similar for being matched with a high- or a low-
skilled agent. Hence, we solve her maximization assuming high-skilled agents
with κ ∈]0, 1[ and θ = θ and replace those values at the end by κ = 1 and θ = θ
to have the solutions for the situation where the principal meets a low-skilled
agent.
As the fraction p of unmotivated agents in a skill group can assume values
from zero to one, we have to look at two different informational situations to
the principal. If the skill group he faces consists of only one motivational type,
which is p ∈ {0, 1}, she has full information about the agent’s characteristics
and can offer the suitable first-best contract. When there are unmotivated and
motivated agents, p ∈]0, 1[, she decides under incomplete information.
3.2.3.1.1 Full Information: First-Best Contracts In the most simple
situation the principal knows the type of the agent she faces. All offered con-
tracts are take-it-or-leave-it offers, so the principal has full bargaining power
and agents accept every offer that meets at least their outside-option. There are
neither alternative employment nor unemployment subsidies. Thus an agent’s
reservation utility is zero.
The principal maximizes her profit with respect to the participation con-
straint of the respective agent. In this case, there need no incentive constraints
to be fulfilled as the principal only offers the suitable first-best contract instead
of one contract for each type.
If there are only motivated agents under high-skilled agents (p = 0), the
principal maximizes her gain Π(q, w) from contracting with a motivated agent:
max
{(q,w)}
ϕ(q)α − w
subject to
u = κw − θ · q + ηqα ≥ 0 (3.9)
The principal makes use of her advantage over the agent and chooses w to
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fulfill the participation constraint with equality. By putting (3.9) into Π(q, w)
and maximizing with respect to q, we get the first order condition
α
(
ϕ+
η
κ
)
(qm∗
FB
)α−1 − θ
κ
= 0.
By an analogous optimization we derive
αϕ(q0∗
FB
)α−1 − θ
κ
= 0.
for a homogenously unmotivated skill group (p = 1). The second order conditions
are always fulfilled. All agents have zero utility. Motivational utility η · (qm∗
FB
)α
is positive, for this reason a negative transfer is paid to the motivated agent.17
The agent buys himself into a work relationship.
Result 3: With homogenously motivated skill groups, the principal
offers to unmotivated agents (p = 1):
{
w0∗FB; q
0∗
FB
}
=
{
θ
κ
(ακ
θ
ϕ
) 1
1−α
;
(ακ
θ
ϕ
) 1
1−α
}
and to motivated agents (p = 0):
{wm∗FB; qm∗FB} ={
θ
κ
[ακ
θ
(
ϕ+
η
κ
)] 1
1−α − η
κ
[ακ
θ
(
ϕ+
η
κ
)] α
1−α
;
[ακ
θ
(
ϕ+
η
κ
)] 1
1−α
}
.
With κ ∈]0, 1[ and θ for high-skilled and κ = 1 and θ for low-
skilled agents.
The principal’s profit with an unmotivated agent results as:
Πm∗FB = (1− α)
(ακ
θ
) α
1−α
(
ϕ+
η
κ
) 1
1−α
, (3.10)
17The existence of agencies, like ProjectsAbroad (http://www.projects-abroad.de) or Exper-
iment e.V. (http://www.experiment-ev.de), that are paid by people from industrial countries
to arrange a possibility to volunteer for themselves in Latin America or Africa, shows that
intrinsic motivation can overcompensate agents over their cost of effort.
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and is with a motivated agent:
Π0∗FB = (1− α)
(ακ
θ
) α
1−α
ϕ
1
1−α . (3.11)
Where again, the suitable values of κ and θ have to be replaced, depending on
the agent’s skill-level.
3.2.3.1.2 Incomplete Information: Second-Best-Solution The second-
best solution is valid for p ∈]0; 1[ with p being the probability of meeting an
unmotivated agent in a certain skill group. Again, we look at the situation,
where the principal meets a high-skilled agent. The principal does not know the
motivational type of the agent, but she knows p and maximizes her expected
profit from a menu of contracts with respect to the participation constraints
of both motivational types of agents and under incentive compatibility, where
superscripts m and 0 stand for motivated and unmotivated agents, respectively.
E[Π] = p · [ϕ(q0)α − w0] + (1− p) · [ϕ(qm)α − wm]
The principal calculates the second-best contracts under asymmetric infor-
mation from:
max
{(w0,q0);(wm,qm)}
E[Π]
subject to
um = κwm − θqm + η(qm)α ≥ 0 (3.12)
u0 = κw0 − θq0 ≥ 0 (3.13)
κwm − θqm + η(qm)α ≥ κw0 − θq0 + η(q0)α (3.14)
κw0 − θq0 ≥ κwm − θqm (3.15)
The motivated (unmotivated) agents’ participation constraint (3.12) ((3.13)) as-
sures no less than their outside utility to every agent. Incentive compatibility
((3.14) and (3.15)) means, that both types cannot improve their situation by
choosing the contract that was written for the other type, as the other’s combi-
nation of lump sum transfer and quantity leads to the same or a lower utility as
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the own contract.
In solving this optimization programme, we apply the common technique18
to stepwise simplify inequalities (3.12) to (3.15) to equalities and plug them
into the objective function to derive the optimal separating menu of contracts.
Implicitly we exclude corner solutions with this procedure19, hence in a second
step, we need to check whether the principal always prefers to offer a separating
menu of contracts or if there exist conditions that make her prefer to offer only
one contract, although p ∈]0, 1[.
Now we want to eliminate side conditions that are already fulfilled by other
conditions: From combining (3.12) with (3.14) and (3.13) with (3.15) we derive
um = κwm − θqm + η(qm)α ≥ κw0 − θq0 + η(q0)α
u0 = κw0 − θq0 ≥ κwm − θqm
It follows that:
um ≥ u0 + η(q0)α (3.16)
u0 ≥ um − η(qm)α (3.17)
By inserting the motivated agent’s participation constraint (3.13) into (3.16)
and with ηqα > 0, for all q > 0 a motivated agent’s utility is greater than or
equal to zero, which is the same as (3.12):
um ≥ κw0 − θq0 + η(q0)α (3.18)
Since the principal is in the position to make a take-it-or-leave-it-offer to the
agent and her profit decreases with increasing w, the principal chooses the lowest
possible transfer which will just satisfy a motivated agent’s incentive constraint
and sets (3.18) to equality. Thus, solving for wm, the transfer to the motivated
18See, e.g. Laffont and Martimort (2002) or Bolton and Dewatripont (2005).
19Delfgaauw and Dur (2008) are unaware of this problem and thus not fully specify the
solution. As we will see in Result 4, also in their model there must be a range of p that their
analysis does not cover.
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agent amounts to
wm = w0 − θ
κ
(q0 − qm) + η
κ
[(q0)α − (qm)α]. (3.19)
Inserting (3.12) and the result for wm into (3.17), we get u0 ≥ u0 + η
κ
[(q0)α−
(qm)α]. It follows:
η
κ
[(q0)α − (qm)α] ≤ 0
which means, that q0∗ < qm∗ has to be valid in the optimum, as motivational
utility is increasing in the quantity produced (ηα(q)α−1 > 0). The unmotivated
agent gets less than u0 by selecting the “wrong” contract and he does not have
any incentive to mimic the motivated type, which we see from (3.17). The
principal chooses the lowest possible transfer to the unmotivated type, which is
w0 = θq0. (3.20)
If (3.20) is put into the equation for wm (3.19), the result is:
wm =
θ
κ
qm +
η
κ
[(q0)α − (qm)α]. (3.21)
This leads to um∗ = η(q0∗)α, which is the motivated agent’s information
rent.20 It is positive as q0∗ > 0. The principal’s maximization of E[Π] can be
simplified by inserting the feasible transfers into the objective function:
max
{q0;qm}
p ·
[
ϕ(q0)α − θ
κ
q0
]
+ (1− p) ·
[
ϕ(qm)α − θ
κ
qm − η
κ
[(q0)α − (qm)α]
]
Second-best quantities are given by the first order conditions:
α
[
ϕ− 1− p
p
· η
κ
]
(q0∗)α−1 =
θ
κ
(3.22)
α
[
ϕ+
η
κ
]
(qm∗)α−1 =
θ
κ
(3.23)
20As the motivational return from q0 is lower than from qm with η(q)α being concave, wm
might be negative in the second-best solution, but the motivated agent’s utility is positive.
But the example in 3.2.3.2 shows that there are parameters that imply positive transfers.
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From equations (3.20) to (3.23) we get as the optimal menu of contracts
offered to a high-skilled agent:
{
w0∗; q0∗
}
=
{
θ
κ
[
ακ
θ
(
ϕ− 1− p
p
· η
κ
)] 1
1−α
;
[
ακ
θ
(
ϕ− 1− p
p
· η
κ
)] 1
1−α
}
(3.24)
{
wm∗; qm∗
}
= (3.25){
θ
κ
[
ακ
θ
(
ϕ+
η
κ
)] 11−α
+
η
κ
[[
ακ
θ
(
ϕ− 1− p
p
· η
κ
)] α
1−α
−
[
ακ
θ
(
ϕ+
η
κ
)] α1−α]
;
[
ακ
θ
(
ϕ+
η
κ
)] 11−α}
,
and by setting κ = 1 and replacing θ with θ the second-best menu of contracts
to a low-skilled agent results:
{
w0∗; q0∗
}
=
{
θ
[
α
θ
(
ϕ− 1− p
p
· η
)] 1
1−α
;
[
α
θ
(
ϕ− 1− p
p
· η
)] 1
1−α
}
, (3.26)
{wm∗; qm∗} = (3.27){
θ
[
α
θ
(ϕ+ η)
] 1
1−α
+ η
[[
α
θ
(
ϕ− 1− p
p
· η
)] α
1−α
−
[
α
θ
(ϕ+ η)
] α
1−α
]
;
[
α
θ
(ϕ+ η)
] 1
1−α
}
.
Whether these contracts are maximizing the principal’s yield function de-
pends on the second order conditions:
α(α− 1)
[
ϕ− 1− p
p
· η
κ
]
(q0∗)α−2
!
< 0 (3.28)
α(α− 1)
[
ϕ+
η
κ
]
(qm∗)α−2
!
< 0 (3.29)
The condition for the motivated agent’s contract (3.29) is always fulfilled as
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α ∈]0, 1[ at both skill-levels. If (3.28) is fulfilled, depends on the sign of the
term in squared brackets. As the rest is negative, the second order condition is
fulfilled for pϕ− (1− p) η
κ
> 0. This leads to the conditions
p > p˜ :=
η
ϕκ+ η
, or p > ˜˜p :=
η
ϕ+ η
(3.30)
for contracting with a high- or a low-skilled agent, respectively. From applying
the implicit functions theorem on (3.22), we see that q0∗ increases, the higher
the proportion of unmotivated agents, whenever the second order condition in
q0∗, which is named SOC(q0∗), is negative:
dqo∗
dp
= −
η
κ
α(q0∗)α−1
SOC(q0∗)
(3.31)
This, of course, is valid for the same situation with a low-skilled agent, too.
Result 4: Under incomplete information and p > p˜ (p > ˜˜p),
the optimal incentive compatible menu of contracts offered by the
firm to a high-skilled (low-skilled) agent is defined by (3.24) and
(3.25) ((3.26) and (3.27)). While the unmotivated type’s contract
changes with p, for the motivated only the optimum transfer de-
pends on p, and thus he produces the efficient quantity at both
skill-levels.
The agents’ respective utilities from being high-skilled are:
u0∗ = 0 and um∗ = η
[
ακ
θ
(
ϕ− 1− p
p
· η
κ
)] α
1−α
(3.32)
and from being low-skilled:
u0∗ = 0 and um∗ = η
[
α
θ
(
ϕ− 1− p
p
η
)] α
1−α
. (3.33)
The second equations of (3.32) and (3.33) show the positive interdependence
between the motivated agent’s utility and the fraction p of unmotivated agents.
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The utility of motivated agents in the separating equilibrium is called information
rent. It is the price the principal pays to a motivated agent over his outside option
in order to make him accept a contract that leaves a higher profit to the principal
than in a situation when the agent accepted the contract for the unmotivated
agent. If there are no unmotivated agents in the qualification group, motivated
agents also get zero utility because the principal knows the agent’s type for
sure (p = 0). The consequence for the principal is: The higher the fraction of
unmotivated agents at a certain skill-level, the higher the transfer she offers the
motivated agent has to be, which reduces her expected profit with a high-skilled
type:
E[ΠSB] = (1− α)
(
ακ
θ
) α
1−α
[
p
(
ϕ− 1− p
p
· η
κ
) 1
1−α
+ (1− p)
(
ϕ+
η
κ
) 1
1−α
]
(3.34)
This solution is valid for contracting with low-skilled agents, too when we
insert θ instead of θ and set κ = 1.
In the preceding analysis we simplified side conditions by eliminating fulfilled
conditions and replacing the transfers. As already mentioned, going that way to
solve the second stage of the model, we implicitly assume that the principal offers
a menu of separating contracts21 instead of one contract to both motivational
types. That is why we need to check if there is no shut-down of one of the types
in the optimum as the chosen way to solve the problem would not give such a
solution. The following question now comes up: Does there exist a situation, in
which it is more profitable for the principal to offer only the first-best contract for
one of the motivational types instead of offering an incentive compatible menu
of contracts? In this situation the expected payoff from the first-best contract
would be higher than the expected payoff from the incentive compatible menu
of contracts.
21If we look at the motivated agents’ utilities in the ranges of p and p where the SOC is
not negative, we find that the participation constraints for these agents are not fulfilled any
more. That means, even if principals would offer this menu, the motivated would not accept
the contracts written to them but those for unmotivated agents. Hence, a menu that is offered
whenever (3.30) is not fulfilled is not a separating menu of contracts.
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3.2.3.1.3 Separation vs. Pooling Under Incomplete Information As
resumed by Result 4, for p ≤ p˜ (p ≤ ˜˜p) the separating menu of contracts is
not maximizing the principal’s yield function. But which alternatives does the
principal have? If she offers both first-best contracts22, the motivated agent will
accept the contract of the unmotivated agent as it returns him a higher utility.
The principal foregoes the higher profit from a contract with a motivated agent
who is willing to accept a “stricter” contract and work for a relatively lower lump
sum transfer, if he does not have a choice. So if the principal offers {w0∗FB, q0∗FB},
she never offers {wm∗FB, qm∗FB} at the same time, as neither the motivated nor the
unmotivated agent would accept the second contract. To see what happens
in a situation where separation is not optimal, we compare the outcomes for
principals when only one of the first-best contracts or the second-best menu of
contracts is offered. Providing only the first-best contract for motivated agents
would lead to a shut-down of the unmotivated, as they have a negative utility
from this contract. Offering only the first-best contract of the unmotivated agent
does not result in shutdown of the motivated agent, but in pooling of both types.
The principal has the choice of contract offer, agents’ utilities from offered
contracts are always at least zero and the separating menu is incentive com-
patible, thus the contracts at choice for the principal will always be accepted,
except the first-best contract offer to a motivated agent, which gives a negative
utility to an unmotivated agent. Hence, we only need to analyze the principal’s
situation. To simplify notation the following scenarios are labeled:
Pooling The first-best-contract for the unmotivated agent (3.11) is of-
fered:
Π0∗FB.
Shutdown The first-best-contract for the motivated agent (3.10) is of-
fered:
(1− p)Πm∗FB.
Separation The separating menu of contracts (3.34) is offered:
E[ΠSB].
22See Result 3.
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Pooling is the situation with a principal only offering the first-best contract
for unmotivated agents and both types are willing to accept. In Shutdown
the first-best contract for motivated agents is offered, so only motivated agents
accept this contract and profits have to be weighted by the fractions of motivated
types at the respective skill-level. For unmotivated agents this contract would
yield a negative utility. In Separation the second-best menu of Result 4 is
offered.23
At first Shutdown and Pooling are compared: For (1−p)Πm∗FB−Π0∗FB > 0
the principal prefers the first-best contract for a motivated agent to offering the
first-best contract for a unmotivated in spite of not all agents accepting the
contract. We again look at the situation, when the principal offers a contract to
a high-skilled agent.
(1− p)(1− α)
(
ακ
θ
) α
1−α (
ϕ+
η
κ
) 1
1−α − (1− α)
(
ακ
θ
) α
1−α
ϕ
1
1−α > 0
It follows that for
p < pˆ := 1−
(
η
κϕ+ η
) 1
1−α
(3.35)
the principal offers the first-best contract for high-skilled motivated agents. For
low-skilled agents, the critical value is p < ˆˆp := 1−
(
η
ϕ+η
) 1
1−α
.
The next step is to compare Shutdown and Separation. From E[Π] −
(1− p)Πm∗FB > 0 results as the critical inequality:
(1− α)
(
pϕ− (1− p)η
κ
) 1
1−α
> 0 (3.36)
The second term in brackets determines the algebraic sign. So from pϕ −
(1− p) η
κ
> 0 follows
p > p˜ or p > ˜˜p (3.37)
as the condition for a separating contract offer. Which is just the case whenever
23The mathematical derivations of the critical values of p are given in Appendix 3.3.3.
CHAPTER 3. SCREENING OF WORKERS’ MOTIVATION 63
the separating menu is not maximizing E[Π] as stated by Result 4.
If E[Π] − Π0∗FB > 0 the principal offers the separating menu of contracts
instead of the first-best contract for the unmotivated agents.
(1− α)
(
ακ
θ
) α
1−α
[
p
(
ϕ− 1− p
p
η
κ
) 1
1−α
+ (1− p)
(
ϕ− η
κ
) 1
1− α
]
−(1− α)
(
ακ
θ
) α
1−α
ϕ
1
1−α > 0
If simplified, the following inequality results:
(1− α)
[
p
(
ϕ− 1− p
p
η
κ
) 1
1−α
+ (1− p)(ϕ− η
κ
)
1
1−α − ϕ 11−α
]
> 0 (3.38)
This inequality holds for (1−α)−1 being an even integer. In those cases, (e.g.
α = 0.5, ϕ = 25 and η = 10, as in the example in 3.2.3.2) the principal prefers
to offer the separating menu of contracts to offering the first-best contract of the
unmotivated agents.
Then it follows that the principal either offers the separating menu of con-
tracts or the first-best contract for the motivated type only, depending on the
value of p. The contract offers at p = 0 and p = 1 are taken from the analysis of
the first-best case, where the principal only faces one motivational type at each
skill-level. With very few unmotivated agents separation does not pay off and
shut-down of the unmotivated type results. Figure 3.4 illustrates the relation
between the principal’s expected gains from the alternative offers. This is com-
parable to the results by Delfgaauw and Dur (2007), where the least motivated
types do not apply for the job as the offered minimum wage does not cover their
cost of application.
Result 5: With incomplete information, the principal offers only
a separating menu if p > p˜ (p > ˜˜p). Otherwise she offers the
first-best contract for motivated agents and there is shut-down of
the unmotivated agents.
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Figure 3.4: Principal’s Expected Gain from Different Contracts Depending on
p.
3.2.3.2 Coordination of Agents at the Outset
Training costs are a tax on agents’ wage, namely: κˆ ·w, with κˆ ∈]0, 1[. These are
already included in the high-skilled agents’ utility from a contract. If motivation
is homogenous or a low fraction of unmotivated agents implies their shutdown,
agents’ utilities are zero and with negative wages for motivated agents the tax
becomes a subsidy. One result of the asymmetric information solution is that
unmotivated agents of both qualifications only get their reservation utility of
zero, that means their utility is independent of qualification. With fixed training
costs there would be no investment in qualification by both motivational types:
The unmotivated agents do not want to become high-skilled as their utility
is independent of qualification and they can never outweigh their qualification
costs. Consequently, motivated agents also would not want to become high-
skilled as there is only an information rent, which would compensate them for
their investment in qualification, if there were also unmotivated agents, in the
group of high-skilled. Overall efficiency is achieved, if there are only high-skilled
agents. Then total rent, irrespective of distribution, is maximized because there
are neither output-distortions nor unmotivated agents, who do not produce as
there is no acceptable contract offered to them. If educational investment cost
depend on the wage, investing is risk free, even to unmotivated agents as cost
can be avoided ex post by not accepting any contract. With κˆ ∈]0, 1[ and a
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heterogenous skill group, there is always at least a small positive amount of
utility left to motivated agents.
Training costs depending on the contractual wage set the unmotivated agents
indifferent between becoming high-skilled and remaining low-skilled, because
both options lead to zero utility. They are assumed to select their qualification
at random with equal probabilities. An equal distribution of unmotivated agents
over both qualification groups results. With this assumption, a homogenously
motivated skill group is excluded, if there is more than one unmotivated agent
in the population. As unmotivated agents always just get their outside-option,
they cannot improve by deviating from their initial choice.
Motivated decide about their education in a coordination game: The fewer
motivated agents are in one’s skill group, the higher is utility. This can be seen
from equations (3.32) and (3.33): A motivated agent’s utility increases with the
fraction of unmotivated agents in his skill group. Thus, a Nash-equilibrium is
reached, if no motivated agent can improve by changing his skill level, given all
others stick to their decisions. But whenever p (p) is smaller than p˜ (˜˜p) from
equation (3.30) motivated agents get a zero utility in the respective skill group
and have at least a weak incentive to deviate (the other option is at least as
good).
For the cases where a principal offers separating contracts we need to go
into more detail. The structure of the problem is illustrated by the following
example:
Numerical Example
When we look at an example of four agents, two motivated
(M1,M2) and two unmotivated (U1, U2), and assume the same
numerical specification as in the example for the continuos case24
we are able to give the motivated agents’ payoffs from becoming
high-skilled (H) and remaining low-skilled (L) in payoff-matrices.
For both unmotivated agents being high-skilled U1, U2 → (H,H)
we get:
24Π = 25
√
q − w, η = 10, κˆ = 0.2, α = 0.5, θ = 2 and θ = 1.
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M2
L H
L 0, 0 0, 75
M1 H 75, 0 50, 50
Here, the equilibrium qualification decisions are U1, U2,M1,M2 →
(H,H,H,H), that is, p = 0.5 and p = 0.
For one high- and one low-skilled unmotivated agent (U1, U2 →
(H,L) or U1, U2 → (L,H)):
M2
L H
L 12.5, 12.5 37.5, 50
M1 H 50, 37.5 0, 0
The equilibria are the anti-coordination strategy combinations of
unmotivated and motivated agents, which lead to p = p = 0.5.
For two low-skilled unmotivated agents (U1, U2 → (L,L)):
M2
L H
L 37.5, 37.5 50, 0
M1 H 0, 50 0, 0
also motivated agents are in equilibrium low-skilled:
U1, U2,M1,M2 → (L,L, L, L) with p = 0 and p = 0.5.
To give the equilibrium fractions of unmotivated agents at both skill-levels,
we need to set motivated agents indifferent between being high- or low-skilled.
Unmotivated agents are always indifferent between both options as their utility
from the second best contract is always zero (compare equations (3.32) and
(3.33)).
When we assume a countable number of agents, we can set x as the number
of unmotivated and low-skilled agents and x as their high-skilled counterparts.
As unmotivated agents are indifferent between the qualification alternatives, we
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can set x = x = x. The same notation is applied to the total number of agents n
with n = n−n describing the interdependence between the number of low-skilled
n and high-skilled n agents. A high-skilled motivated agent does not regret his
investment for:
∆umI = u
m
I (low)− umI (high)
= η
[
α
θ
(
ϕ− n− n+ 1− x
x
η
)] α
1−α
− η
[
ακ
θ
(
ϕ− n− x
x
· η
κ
)] α
1−α
· (1− κ)
≤ 0
A motivated agent prefers to remain low-skilled instead of becoming high-skilled
for:
∆umII = u
m
II(high)− umII(low)
= η
[
ακ
θ
(
ϕ− n+ 1− x
x
· η
κ
)] α
1−α
· (1− κ)− η
[
α
θ
(
ϕ− n− n− x
x
η
)] α
1−α
≤ 0
The next step is to calculate the critical values of x/n for both inequalities
to find a range of p = x/n where both inequalities are fulfilled:
p ≥ x
nI
=
xη(θ + θ)
θx(κϕ− η)− θ(ϕx− (n− x)η) + θη
p ≤ x
nII
=
xη(θ + θ)
θx(κϕ− η)− θ(ϕx− (n− x)η)− θη
Because we are looking for a p that fulfills both inequalities, we look for
combinations of the variables that yield x
nI
≤ x
nII
. This is given for
θx(κϕ− η)− θ(ϕx− (n− x)η)− θη > 0,
which is, the denominator of x
nII
is positive. When we apply the same reasoning
for low-skilled agents we have:
p ≥ x
nI
=
xη(θ + θ)
nη(θ + θ)− θx(κϕ− η) + θ(ϕx− (n− x)η) + θη
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p ≤ x
nII
=
xη(θ + θ)
nη(θ + θ)− θx(κϕ− η) + θ(ϕx− (n− x)η)− θη
This leads to a valid range for nη(θ+θ)−θx(κϕ−η)+θ(ϕx−(n−x)η)+θη > 0.
Hence, the equilibrium qualification rates of high- and low-skilled motivated
agents are defined:
Result 6:
a. As only the first-best contract for motivated agents is offered
for p < p˜ (p < ˜˜p), all results of the agents’ qualification
decisions that imply these fractions of unmotivated agents at
both skill-levels are equilibria.
b. If separating menus are offered, max{ x
nI
, p˜} ≤ p ≤ x
nII
and
max{ x
nI
, ˜˜p} ≤ p ≤ x
nII
define the equilibrium qualification
rates for unmotivated agents at both skill-levels, as deviation
from qualification choice does not pay off to any agent.
What follows from Results 5 and 6 are two possible situations: On the one
hand, the agents’ qualification decision in combination with given motivational
types can lead to low fractions of unmotivated agents at both skill-levels and
principals offer only the first-best contract to motivated agents.25 On the other,
the coordination game of stage one may result in heterogenous agent-groups
at the skill-levels, such that the separating menu of contracts is offered. If we
want to compare these alternatives from a welfare perspective, the separating
menu would lead to higher overall production as under shut-down not the whole
workforce produces and thus the pie to divide between principals and agents is
larger in the first situation.
This type of coordination problem arises whenever agents endogenously
choose one of their characteristics and in addition determine with this deci-
sion the distribution of unobservable types for a later screening-game. In our
model even the decision about an observable characteristic (skill-type) influences
25If a motivated agent deviates,p falls for the skill-level he moves to. Hence pnew < p˜new is
still valid. In the case of pold becoming larger than p˜old this does not have an influence on the
deviating agent’s decision.
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the distribution of unobservable motivation relevant to principals. To give an
example of a decision about an unobservable characteristic, that is relevant to
a principal’s contract offer, we complete the theoretical model of Kirstein and
Bleich (2008) by analyzing the agents’ coordination problem in a situation with
screening on unobservable endogenous qualification in the Appendix (3.3.4).
3.2.4 Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter we analyzed a screening game of intrinsic motivation with endoge-
nous qualification. A motivational term was introduced into the agent’s utility
function to reflect intrinsic work motivation. At first, we assume a continuous
distribution of motivation. The principal offers menus of contracts depending
on the distribution of motivational types at the respective skill-levels. Agents
reveal their type by choosing the suitable contract and only the least motivated
type gets zero, all others get a positive rent. On the first stage of this game,
becoming high-skilled is either the (weakly-) dominating strategy for all agents
or for none of them. This stems from the assumption that the principal does
not update his belief regarding the distribution of unmotivated agents inside the
two skill groups and thus makes contract offers suiting the initial distribution of
motivation. Decisions only depend on qualification cost κˆ, and the skill param-
eters θ and θ, but not on motivation itself. We also gave an intuitive example
with a well behaved solution.
In the second part, a situation with discrete motivational levels, motivated
and unmotivated, was described and for some fractions of unmotivated agents in
a skill group, we found shut-down of unmotivated types: Only the suitable first-
best contract for motivated agents is offered in both skill groups. In a situation
with very few unmotivated agents, the principal wants to avoid selection cost in
the form of paying an information rent to the motivated agent. As the probability
of meeting an unmotivated type is low, she risks that this type will not accept the
motivated’s first-best contract as his utility from it is negative. But as the first-
best outcome has the highest gain for the principal, her expected payoff from
this option is higher than offering a selecting menu of contracts. This result
is untypical for a screening model as full separation of types in the second-
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best situation is most frequent.26 Then, we looked at the motivated agents’
qualification decision at the first stage and found that unmotivated agents are
always indifferent when deciding about investing into qualification as their utility
is always zero. For motivated agents the profitability of investing depends on the
fractions of unmotivated agents at both skill-levels, and so does the equilibrium
qualification decision.
A new assumption of this approach, is that qualification cost are a fraction
of the wage instead of having a fixed value. The mathematical/practicability
reasons for this assumption are given in Appendix 3.3.2. We showed that a
system of proportional qualification cost leads to a higher overall qualification
than fixed value qualification cost. Motivated only profit from being high-skilled
when there are unmotivated agents the principal needs to select them from. If
investing is risk-free to unmotivated agents, they may also become high-skilled
and the overall qualification rate increases. Thus production increases and hence
efficiency. If the state wants to increase efficiency, he provides possibilities to
finance qualification measures by income taxes to the high-skilled.
This model’s structure may also be applied to a situation where agents differ
in innate abilities and are able to decide about their qualification. For example,
the ability to work in a team does not have an influence on the cost of taking
part in qualification measures. Hence, by choosing their qualification level, team
workers influence their distribution, that becomes relevant when principals screen
for abilities.
When we transfer these results back to the introducing example of employers’
selection of university graduates, we can state, that university access may not
be regulated by fixed-amount tuition fees. This would keep the unmotivated
prospective employees and in consequence the motivated from studying27, as
they only profit from their degree if also unmotivated can reach one. If the
state or universities can afford that, they should provide educational loans with
repayment depending on the students’ work situation after graduating.
26See e.g. Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), p. 94.
27If there are no other sources than their own to finance studies.
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3.3 Appendix
3.3.1 The Motivational Screening-Game
Although screening-models in the literature are traditionally formulated as in
Section 3.2.2, we want to state it here as it would be done in game-theory to
provide another view and starting point for readers coming from that area of
theoretical modeling.
...with Continuously Distributed Motivation:
We have two types of players: Agents Ai with i = 1, ..., n and Principals Pj with
j = 1, ..., n. The timing of the game is as follows:
1. Nature draws the motivational type ηik for each agent from the set of
feasible types E= [η, η] according to the probability distribution F (η) with
density f(η), which is common knowledge to all Ai and Pi.
2. Each agent observes his own motivational type ηik and decides about his
qualification θl which can either be high (θ) or low (θ), with θl being the
cost of producing one quantity unit and θ < θ.
3. All agents and principals are matched randomly into pairs.
4. Each principal Pj observes θil of his agent Ai but not his motivational type
ηik. A principal only knows F (η).
5. Principals offer a menu of contracts consisting of combinations of lump
sum wage w from the set of feasible wages W∈ IR and production quantity
q from the set of feasible quantities Q= [0, r] ⊂ IR+.
6. Agents decide whether to accept one of the contract offers from their prin-
cipal or not.
7. Payoffs are given by: ui(ηik, θil, w, q) for agent Ai and Πj(w, q) for principal
Pj.
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The game-tree for agent Ai and principal Pj is given in Figure 3.5. Nature
draws ηik for each agent. This is equivalent to nature drawing randomly from a
set that contains all possible combinations of ηik for all agents Ai. But as this is
hard to depict, we decide in favor of explanatory content and let nature draw ηik
for each single agent. Knowing their own ηik agents decide about their own skill-
level θil. Then the initial distribution of motivation F (η) which applies to high-
and low-skilled agents is announced to the principals, in our model we assume
that principals do not try to derive the actual distribution of motivation that
results from the agents qualification decisions. Hence, there are two different
information sets for the principal, namely high- (θ) and low-skilled (θ) agents,
where the principal assumes for both the same distribution F (η). The principal
offers contracts [w(η), q(η)] for all possible η and the agent chooses to accept one
or none of them.
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Figure 3.5: Game-Tree: Screening on Continuous Motivation
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... with Two-Point Distributed Motivation:
We have two types of players: Agents Ai with i = 1, ..., n and Principals Pj with
j = 1, ..., n. Agents’ qualification decisions have an influence on the motivational
distributions at both skill-levels. The timing of the game is as follows:
1. Nature draws the motivational type ηik for each agent from the set of
feasible types E= {η, η} with the probability t of being unmotivated (η).
2. Agents each observe their own motivational type ηik and decide about their
qualification θl which can either be high (θ) or low (θ), with θl being the
cost of producing one quantity unit and θ < θ.
3. The resulting frequencies of unmotivated agents, which are the probabili-
ties of meeting an unmotivated agent to the principals, are announced for
both skill-levels: p for high-skilled and p for low-skilled.
4. All agents and principals are matched randomly into pairs.
5. Each principal Pj observes θil of his agent Ai but not his motivational type
ηik.
6. Principals offer a menu of contracts consisting of up to two combinations of
a lump sum wage w from the set of feasible wages W∈ IR and a production
quantity q from the set of feasible quantities Q= [0, r] ⊂ IR+.
7. Agents decide whether to accept one of the contract offers from their prin-
cipal or not.
8. Payoffs are given by: ui(ηik, θil, w, q) for agent Ai and Πj(w, q) for principal
Pj.
The game-tree is given in Figure 3.6 for agent Ai and principal Pj. That
a principal offers a menu of contracts, is described by the triangulars with one
rounded side.
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Figure 3.6: Game-Tree: Screening on Two-Point Distributed Motivation
3.3.2 A Note on Outside Options and Qualification Costs
In Section 3.2.2.1 we assumed the agents’ outside options to be zero. As quali-
fication cost are a fraction of the contracted wage this seems a quite restrictive
assumption. But when looking at the different possibilities the resulting outcome
leads to the same qualitative solution as the simplified version does.
The quantity choice is not influenced by a positive outside-option as it drops
out if utility is derived with respect to quantity. So the difference is only a
redistribution from the principal to the agent.
With fixed cost of qualification, qualification is no longer free for an un-
motivated agent and he will never invest in high qualification. If there are no
unmotivated agents at the high skill-level, it also does not pay off to the moti-
vated agents to invest in qualification as they get no information rent and are
worse off if becoming high-skilled.
If education is offered by government, its aim function could be overall wel-
fare, which we define as the sum of gains to agents and principals. The more is
produced the larger is the pie to divide between principal and agent up to the
optimal production quantities determined in the first-best solution. So overall
welfare is determined by production. High qualification leads to higher produc-
tion, and thus the state wants as much agents to become highly qualified as
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possible. As motivated agents only take part in education if unmotivated agents
do, they need to be at least indifferent regarding their decision to invest.
3.3.3 Comparison of Scenarios
Shutdown vs. Pooling
If (1 − p)Πm∗FB − Π0∗FB ≥ 0 the principal prefers offering the first-best contract
for motivated types over offering the first-best contract for unmotivated agents
in a situation with 0 < p < 1. In the following the range of p is derived that
validates this inequality:
(1− p)(1− α)
(
ακ
θ
) α
1−α (
ς +
η
κ
) 1
1−α − (1− α)
(
ακ
θ
) α
1−α
ς
1
1−α > 0
(1− p)
(
ς +
η
κ
) 1
1−α − ς 11−α > 0(
ς + η
κ
) 1
1−α − ς 11−α(
ς + η
κ
) 1
1−α
> p
p < pˆ := 1−
(
ϕ
ϕ+ η
κ
) 1
1−α
.
For low-skilled unmotivated agents, the critical range is given by:
p < ˆˆp := 1−
(
ϕ
ϕ+ η
) 1
1−α
.
Separation vs. Shutdown
Although by offering only the first best contract to the motivated agent, a prin-
cipal has a chance to get the maximum of possible payoffs, she risks meeting
an unmotivated agent who will not accept the contract. A separating contract
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could, depending on p yield a higher expected gain to the principal, whenever
E[Π]− (1− p)Πm∗FB > 0
(1− α)
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It follows as the critical values of p and thus p:
p > p˜ :=
η
κϕ+ η
and p > ˜˜p :=
η
ϕ+ η
Separation vs. Pooling
If the principal decides to offer one pooling-contract the contract will be accepted
by both types but she forgoes the additional gain from offering a more suitable
contract for the motivated agent.
E[Π]− Π0∗FB > 0
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η
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) 1
1−α − ϕ 11−α > 0
This inequality is fulfilled at both skill-levels for (1−α)−1 being an even integer.
3.3.4 A Coordination Game with Unobservable Qualifi-
cation
In the theoretical model by Kirstein and Bleich (2008) agents differ with respect
to unobservable qualification, which they choose in the first stage of a three-
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stage-game by deciding to invest into qualification at cost K > 0 or not to
invest. After taking part in qualification, agents are high-skilled whereas they
remain low-skilled if they do not invest. In contrast to the situation laid out in
Section 3.2, cost K are a fixed amount that has to be paid by agents before each
of them is randomly matched to one principal. In the second stage, principals
screen with respect to qualification, in the third and last stage agents decide to
accept or reject a contract offer.
From the agents’ investment decisions the fraction b of low-skilled agents in
the population results28. A principal’s optimal contract offer for heterogenous
agents is a menu of contracts, that offers a high-skilled agent an information
rent that exceeds his outside option and depends on b. Low-skilled agents’
payoffs from such an optimal menu are always zero. The higher b, the higher
is the information rent and hence the profitability of investing depends on the
outcome of the simultaneuos qualification decisions. As there is no means of
coordination available, this decision is a coordination problem to the ex ante
low-skilled agents in terms of who should invest in productivity.
The information rent in Kirstein and Bleich (2008) (p.6) is: R∗ = t∗−0.5q∗ =
50b2
(1+b)2
with t as a lump-sum transfer and q as the production quantity. It accrues
to a high-skilled agent for b ∈ [0, 1[. For b∗ to be the equilibrium rate of low-
skilled agents in the coordination game, there may not be any incentives for low-
skilled as well as for high-skilled agents to deviate from their investment decision.
As the number of agents is discrete and every single agent’s qualification decision
changes the market situation, we set
b =
x
n
and R(b) =
50
(
x
n
)2(
1 + x
n
)2
Where n is the size of the population (the total number of agents) and x < n
counts the number of low-skilled agents. By setting the individual incentives to
deviate for high- and low-skilled agents to zero, we calculate the equilibrium b∗
that fulfills both conditions of no deviation at the same time.
A low-skilled agent does not prefer to be high-skilled under b = x/n if
28p from the original text by Kirstein and Bleich (2008) is replaced by b to avoid confusion.
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∆uI = u(high)− u(low) = 50(x− 1)
2
(n+ x− 1)2 −K − 0
!≤ 0 (3.39)
The critical numbers of low-skilled agents are:
xI1 =
K − 50− n(5√2K −K)
K − 50
xI2 =
K − 50 + n(5√2K −K)
K − 50
There is no incentive to become high-skilled for them, if
x ∈ [xI2, xI1] (3.40)
A high-skilled agent does not regret his investment decision if
∆uII = u(low)− u(high) = 0− 50x
2
(n+ x)2
+K
!≤ 0 (3.41)
and thus to him the critical values are:
xII1 =
n(−5√2K −K)
K − 50
xII2 =
n(5
√
2K −K)
K − 50
Where inequality (3.41) is fulfilled for
x ≥ xII1 ∨ x ≤ xII2
Assuming K < 50, as for higher values investment into qualification never
pays off, we see that xII2 < 0 < x
II
1 . As x represents the number of low-skilled
agents in the population, it may not assume negative values. Now we are inter-
ested in the values of x that fulfill both inequalities (3.39) and (3.41). This is
the intersection of x ∈ [xI2, xI1] and x ≥ xII1 . If xII1 < xI2, the equilibrium number
of low-skilled agents lies within the boundaries of (3.40):
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xII1 < x
I
2
n(−5√2K −K)
K − 50 <
K − 50 + n(5√2K −K)
K − 50
K2 − 100(1− 2n2)K + 2500 > 0 (3.42)
The resulting inequality (3.42) is always fulfilled for n,K ≥ 1. As we are
looking for the equilibrium fraction of low-skilled agents b∗ in a population of n
agents, we now calculate the upper and lower bounds of b∗ = x/n depending on
K.
b∗ ∈
[
max
{
0,
1
n
+
5
√
2K −K
K − 50
}
;
1
n
− 5
√
2K −K
K − 50
]
(3.43)
The equilibrium fraction of low-skilled agents may only be between zero and
one, thus for one of the borders assuming larger or smaller values, b∗ becomes
1, respectively 0. The lower bound is smaller than zero for n > 50−K
5
√
2K−K , which
results in b∗ = 0, the upper is never larger than one for 0 < K < 50 and n > 1
as n < 50−K
50−5√2K is never valid. Hence, all fractions of b that lie within the range
stated by (3.43) constitute equilibrium qualification decisions of the agents.
For the experimental treatment K5 of Kirstein and Bleich (2008) with n = 4
and investment cost of K = 5, an investment is profitable, if at least half of the
agent population chooses not to invest. If K > 9, as e.g. in Treatment K15, it
is a dominant strategy not to invest, because t∗ − 0.5q∗ ≤ 9 for b ∈ [0, 1].
Chapter 4
Going on the Long Race
4.1 Long-Term Work Contracts
4.1.1 Introduction
Bewley (1995) and (1998) found in interviews with managers, counselors of the
unemployed, labor leaders, and headhunters, that wages do not fall during a
recession. He sees the reasons mainly in the employer’s fear of the workers’
reactions to lower wages which could be less effort or even the declaration of a
strike. Agell and Bennmarker (2007) list additional reasons for downward wage
rigidities. In their study from 1999 they surveyed swedish managers from five
different industrial sectors about the standard theoretical explanations for no
downward wage adjustment. They found that efficiency wages as well as the
presence of labor unions have a high influence on managers’ wage decisions. In
that case, very few workers’ (1.1%) wages were cut during the prior recession.
It is important to note that the workers’ expectations do not only refer to their
own previous wage but also to the average wage of the person’s occupation.
Until the 80s of the 20th century most Germans worked for one employer for
their entire life. Dundler and Mu¨ller (2006) found evidence that 59% of German
male employees born in the 1940s (46% of those born in the 1950s) were employed
in their first job for at least 20 years. The years of continuos first employment
fall for later birth cohorts. For the 1990s Henneberger and Sousa-Poza (2002)
found an increase in job fluctuation from 7.4% in 1992/93 to 10.2% in 1999/2000
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for Switzerland. These data show, that nowadays there is much more fluctuation
in the labor market. On the one hand, people change occupations to push their
career, on the other hand markets have become more flexible and bear more
risk than in the mid 20th century. Hence, both employers and employees have
reasons to constantly move on rather than staying in the same relationship a
worker’s entire life. Although job fluctuation increased, most employment is still
open-ended. As we can see from Figure 4.1 fixed-term contracts seem to be
an exception in the EU on average: In 2007 85.5% of employees worked under
open-ended contracts.1 In Germany this may be due to the Part-Time and
Fixed-Term Contract Act (Teilzeit- und Befristungsgesetz), which restricts the
conclusion of short-term contracts (§ 14 II TzBfG): Employers are not allowed
to contract more than three times with the same worker in short-term contracts
within two years. That fixed-term contracts need to be ruled by law shows that
there are many firms that like to offer series of short-term contracts to be able
to react flexibly to market changes.
There are some differences between EU countries in the last years (2000–
2007) with respect to fixed-term contracts: Germany as well as the EU as a
whole have a quite stable rate of fixed-term employed workers of 12–14%. In
Estonia, starting with 3% in 2000, the fraction of fixed-term workers decreased,
in Spain this was also the fact but started at a much higher level of over 30%.
These numbers reflect frictions on the respective labor markets. While Germany
has a more or less average strict employment protection legislation inside the
EU, Spain’s strict laws lead employers to offer many fixed-term contracts to cir-
cumvent those. The Estonian legislation in contrast allows flexible adjustments
of wages and/or employment to react to market fluctuations.
These observations lead to the question, if there is an interdependence be-
tween the flexibility of wage adjustment and contract duration. Does higher job
fluctuation result from missing possibilities to adjust wages downward in a re-
cession? Or do employers want to cloud falling wages by offering only short-term
contracts as they fear workers’ efforts to fall?
1Data from EuroStat.
3Own diagram from EuroStat data.
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Figure 4.1: Percentage of Fixed-term Employed Employees in the EU and Se-
lected EU Member States3
In our experiment we want to test these alternative explanations4. The flexi-
bility of a contract is reflected by the adjustment rules to lump sum transfers and
piece rates, which are set together with the contract duration by the employer
when she offers a contract to a randomly matched worker. Market changes are
introduced by a stochastic market wage. The employers’ optimal behavior de-
pends in our model on the rules of wage adjustment and the market wage in the
period the contract is offered. Workers accept contracts that guarantee them at
least their expected utility from the market wage and choose effort depending
on the piece rate. Whenever we observe falling wages when market wage falls,
effort should, according to Bewley (1998) and Agell and Bennmarker (2007), also
decrease.
A theoretical model by Danziger (1988) analyzes a two-period economy with
real and nominal shocks: Under inflexible contractual conditions optimal con-
tract duration for workers depends on the probability of a real shock. Nominal
4This chapter is an extended version of Berninghaus, Gu¨th, and Bleich (2008).
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shocks do not influence optimal choice. If the probability of a real shock is low,
the worker prefers two one-period contracts over a two-period contract, as he
does not need to be insured against a shock. Although he choses a completely
different way to describe the problem, our model yields similar results: Optimal
contract duration depends on the flexibility of a contract, allowing an employer
to react quickly to exogenous changes.
To our knowledge there is only one experiment on labor contract duration
under effort choice and changes in the market wage: ? (?) test wage adjustments
in a two-period-world under perfect foresight of a drop in the market wage in
the second period. They do observe lower wages in the second period, although
employers could have included the change in period two in their first period wage
offers. The only labor market experiments with endogenous contract duration
are those by Brown, Falk, and Fehr (2004). In contrast to our design, a long-term
contract is not concluded by contracting over a previously determined number
of periods but when an employer offers another contract to the employee at the
end of their contract. We also have this opportunity but both contract partners
need to agree to be matched again. What is more, the market wage is fixed in
their experiments. What Brown et al. (2004) observe is the profitability of long-
term contracts under incomplete contracts. In our setting this is only the case
where employers are able to sanction shirking workers. Both profit from long-
term contracts due to effort smoothing and avoiding market risk. Anderhub,
Ko¨nigstein, and Ku¨bler (2003) also ran experiments with endogenous long-term
labor contracts, but the authors’ focus lay on firm-specific investments by agents.
The following section describes the theoretical model that underlies the ex-
periment and its solution. In section 4.2 the experimental parameters and the
statistical analysis of experimental results are given. In section 4.3 a conclusion
follows.
4.1.2 The Theoretical Model
4.1.2.1 Fixed Wage Flexibility and Effort Choice
With a finite number of T periods, workers and employers meet one by one. The
number of employers and workers is equal. That means there is neither com-
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petition for jobs nor for workers. Each employer offers an employment contract
σ = (w; s; τ) to one worker. The contract consists of a fixed wage w ≥ 0, a piece
rate s ∈ [0, 1] and the contract duration τ ≥ 0. Workers are credit constrained.
If the respective worker accepts the offered contract, he chooses his effort level
e. If no contract is concluded, both are matched with new partners in the next
period. The worker is assumed to be risk neutral and his utility from a contract
is
U = w + P · s · e− c
2
e2.
Effort directly converts into output units, which are sold at the fixed price P .
The piece rate (s ∈ [0, 1]) is a division rule and divides the sales revenue (P · e)
between employer and worker. c > 0 is equal for all workers. The employer’s
gain from a contract is
Π = P (1− s)e− w.
If the worker does not accept the contract, he is employed at the market wage wc,
which is positive and randomly drawn from a uniform distribution with known
limits each period anew (wc ∈ [wc, wc]). The employer gets zero profit. There
is no information about future market wages. Also during a long-term contract
(τ > 1) there is a new market wage in each period.
We look at different rules of wage adjustment inside of a long-term contract,
from completely fixed to totally flexible wages. The applying rules of adjustment
for an employer are assigned to five different experimental treatments and will be
described in the following section. As the worker chooses effort in each period,
he is able to react to changes. There is no possibility to terminate an employer-
employee relationship before the end of the contracted duration.
4.1.2.2 Rules of Wage Adjustment in the Experiment
As we want to look at wage rigidities under different flexibility regimes, we intro-
duce five different experimental treatments; in each of them contract duration
can never be changed.
• No flexibility: In a long-term contract fixed wage and piece rate cannot be
adjusted.
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• Partial Upward flexibility: The employer can raise the fixed wage over the
wage of the previous contract period. The contracted piece rate is fixed.
• Upward flexibility: Fixed wage and piece rate can be increased by the
employer during a long-term contract.
• Partial Total flexibility: The fixed wage can be varied freely (w ≥ 0) by
the employer. The contracted piece rate is fixed.
• Total flexibility: Fixed wage and piece rate can be set anew (w ≥ 0,
s ∈ [0, 1]) in each period of a long-term contract.
The only possibility to react to a wage change for workers is to adjust effort. A
concluded contract cannot be canceled. In treatments N, PU and U we expect
employers to offer mainly short-term contracts (one period) to keep the possi-
bility to react to changes in the market wage, which then represent the workers’
outside option. Workers are expected to exert less effort as even in long-term
contracts there is no possibility for employers to fine them by decreasing wages.
Employers and workers are not identifiable, hence there is also no reputation
building. Treatments PT and T have no rules of fixed wage adjustment. In this
case employers do not incur any risk by offering long-term contracts as they can
also adjust to falls in the market wage. Workers should exert higher effort as
they may be fined by their employer for shirking.
At the end of each contract, employer and worker are asked whether they
want to interact again with the same partner or want to be randomly matched
to a free other player (random stranger matching). This is done to give the
opportunity to conclude a series of short-term contracts which, according to
results by Antoni and Jahn (2006), may be a reason for falling contract durations
in the German labor market.
4.1.3 Theoretical Analysis
At first, the situation of a new contract offer in the last period is discussed.
The employer-worker-pair is either a random new match or both wanted to be
matched again with the same partner. It is important to note, that in this
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situation the fixed wage as well as the piece rate can be set freely as there is
no downward boundary from earlier periods. This solution also applies to all
other periods with new contracts if players are myopic. Secondly, we look at
earlier periods and rationalize the conclusion of long-term contracts for some
treatments.
4.1.3.1 Behavior in the Last Period
In the last period the employer can only offer a one-period contract. We solve
the employer’s problem to choose a contract by applying backward induction.
The last decision is the worker’s effort choice, depending on the piece rate, which
is maximizing his utility:
max
e
U(e) = max
e
w + Pse− c
2
e2
∂U(e)
∂e
= Ps− ce != 0
e∗ =
Ps
c
(4.1)
This choice gives the worker a utility of
U(e∗) = w +
(Ps)2
2c
.
His outside-option is the market wage wc. The employer takes the worker’s
outside-option and his optimal choice of effort e∗ into account, when maximizing
her gain from an accepted contract. So the employer maximizes her gain by
choosing wages:
max
s,w
Π(s, w) = max
s,w
(1− s)sP
2
c
− w
subject to
wc ≤ w + (Ps)
2
2c
(4.2)
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As the employer is in the position to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer, she sets
the side condition to an equality, introduces it into Π(s, w) and maximizes over
the choice of s, hence we have:
∂Π(s)
∂s
=
P 2(1− s)
c
!
= 0
s∗ = 1 (4.3)
The optimal piece rate leaves all the sales revenue to the worker. This situa-
tion is efficient, because the worker exerts the highest effort. The optimal fixed
wage is w∗ = wc− P 2
2c
. In the experiment we chose parameters P = 10, c = 1 and
wc ∈ {13, 14, ..., 30}. For these values w∗ = wc − 50, which cannot be positive.
As we only allow non-negative wage offers, the profit maximizing contract cannot
be offered by the employer. If she offered instead s = 1 and w = 0, the worker
would accept the contract, as it would give him U(s = 1, w = 0) = 50, which
is more than wc, but the employer would have zero gain. The employer sets
the fixed wage to zero (w∗;SB = 0) and chooses s to fulfill the worker’s outside
option. This results in:
s∗;SB =
1
P
√
2c · wc.
The worker accepts the second best contract σ∗;SB = (0; 1
P
√
2c · wc; 1) as it
pays him the market wage. The employer’s profit from this contract is Π(s∗;SB) =
P
c
√
2c · wc−2wc, which is positive for our experimental parameters. The worker
exerts effort e∗;SB = 1
c
√
2c · wc.
The second best contract in the last period/for myopic players is short-term,
so there are no differences between treatments. The situation where myopic
players are in a long-term contract with an already downward bounded fixed
wage, does not occur (theoretically) as for this type of players there is no incentive
to conclude long-term contracts.
4.1.3.2 Finitely Repeated Interaction
In all other periods employers could offer contracts with a longer duration. If
the profit from long-term contracts is higher than from offering a series of short-
term contracts, no short-term contracts will be offered. With τ as the offered
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contract duration and without depreciation, the worker’s expected utility in the
offer period t and all future periods can be stated as:
U outt = w
c
t + (τ − 1)
wc + wc
2
with wc and wc representing the lower and upper bounds to the uniformly dis-
tributed market wage. U outt is the outside option of a farsighted worker in period
t. As the worker will always be in the position to accept or reject a take-it-or-
leave-it offer, employers will set him to his outside option, which is the market
wage. In a long-term contract the employer has to pay a piece rate and/or a
fixed wage to set the worker indifferent between his outside option and accept-
ing the offered contract. At first, we look at situations with a downward fixed
piece rate (treatments N, PU, PT and U). Here the piece rate is guaranteed for
the contract’s duration. The employer takes into account the worker’s optimal
choice of effort e∗ = Ps
c
and sets the worker’s expected utility from the long-term
contract equal to his outside option:
τ ·
[
P sˆ · P sˆ
c
− c
2
·
(
P sˆ
c
)2]
= U outt
sˆ =
1
P
·
√
U outt · 2c
τ
(4.4)
With this piece rate sˆ and a zero fixed wage, the worker is indifferent between
the outside option and the offered long-term contract σˆ = (0, sˆ, τ) which gives
to the employer Πˆ = P
c
√
Uoutt ·2c
τ
− 2Uoutt
τ
. The employer’s alternative to offering
σˆ = (0; sˆ; τ) is to offer τ 1-period-contracts in a row.
These contracts would be written according to the rules of the previous sec-
tion, σ∗;SB = (0; 1
P
√
2c · wc; 1), starting in period t:
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τ · Πˆt > Π∗;SBt +
τ+t∑
n=t+1
E(Π∗;SBn )
τ
P
c
√
2c · U outt
τ
− 2 · U outt >
P
√
2c · wct
c
− 2wct
+E
(
τ+t∑
n=t+1
[
P
√
2c · wcn
c
− 2 · wcn
])
τ
P
c
√
2c
√
U outt
τ
− 2 · U outt >
P
√
2c · wct
c
+E
(
τ+t∑
n=t+1
P
√
2c · wcn
c
)
− 2wct − 2E
(
τ+t∑
n=t+1
wcn
)
τ
P
c
√
2c
√
U outt
τ
− 2 · U outt >
P
√
2c · wct
c
+
P
√
2c
c
· E
(
τ+t∑
n=t+1
√
wcn
)
−2wct − 2(τ − 1)
wm + wm
2
τ
P
c
√
2c
√
U outt
τ
− 2 · U outt >
P
c
√
2c
[√
wct + (τ − 1)E(
√
wct )
]
− 2 · U outt
√
τ · U out > √wct + (τ − 1)E(√wct )
Here, the expected piece rate of a one period contract depending on all pos-
sible market wages that realize with equal probabilities is
E(
√
wct ) =
∑wm
i=wm
√
i
](poss. market wages)
.
With our experimental parameters the inequality that dictates the employer’s
decision becomes:
g(wct , τ) = τ
√
wct + 21.5(τ − 1)
τ
−√wct − (τ − 1) · 4.6 > 0
g(wct , τ) is always positive which can be seen from Figure 4.2. The employer
offers only long-term contracts σˆ = (0; sˆ; τ) with the maximum duration, as her
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profit from effort smoothing is higher than from offering a series of short-term
contracts σ∗;SB and increases with the number of contract periods.
Figure 4.2: Employer’s Gain from Effort-smoothing for Different Contract Du-
rations and Market Wages in the Offer Period
In the next section, we look at a situation with fully flexible piece rates during
an existing contract. With some rigidities to wage adjustment, the employer has
to take into account the worker’s outside option of working at the market wage.
But if a worker once is locked into a long-term contract, the employer may now
exploit this situation and set the piece rate freely. Thus, it is necessary to look
at that situation separately.
4.1.3.3 Piece Rate Flexibility
In treatment T of our experiment the fixed wage as well as the piece rate can be
set anew each period during a contractual relationship by the employer. That
means, during a contract the piece rate can also be decreased. With the accep-
tance of a long-term contract the worker looses his outside option of getting the
market wage and is subject to the employer’s goodwill.
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We solve the employer’s problem by applying backward induction. In the
final period τ of a long-term contract the emloyer is able to change fixed wage
and piece rate without any side conditions except non-negativity. She maximizes:
max
sτ
− wτ + (1− sτ )sτ P
2
c
and sets the optimal piece rate s∗τ = 0.5. She is able to do this, irrespective of
the actual market wage because the worker’s outside option at this time is zero
as he cannot quit the contract. The fixed wage is only a transfer to the worker
and can be set to w∗τ = 0. This kind of reasoning applies to all earlier contract
periods except the offer period, where the positive expected outside option of
the worker (U outt ) has to be taken into account. The worker’s utility from a
long-term contract becomes:
U(w1, s1, w
∗
τ , s
∗
τ , τ) = w1 +
(Ps1)
2
2c
+ (τ − 1) ·
[
w∗τ +
(Ps∗τ )
2
2c
]
.
This has to be at least equal to the worker’s outside option and becomes the
side condition of the employer’s maximization problem in each period she offers
a contract. Thus the employer maximizes her gain
Π(w1, s1) = −w1 + (1− s1)s1P
2
c
+ (τ − 1)
[
−w∗τ + (1− s∗τ ) · s∗τ
P 2
c
]
presuming optimal behavior of the worker. The employer’s contract offer results
from:
max
w1,s1
Π(w1, s1) (4.5)
subject to
w1 +
(Ps1)
2
2c
+ (τ − 1) ·
[
w∗τ +
(Ps∗τ )
2
2c
]
≥ U outt
As the employer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the worker, she sets the
side condition to an equality. After solving the side condition for s1, it is intro-
duced into the employer’s yield function, which is then maximized over w1. We
get a fixed wage for the contract offer period of:
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w∗1 = U
out
t − (τ − 1)
p2
4c
.
If we plug this into the side condition of (4.5) we get a piece rate of s∗1 = 0.
The expected value of the employer’s gain is E(Π∗1) = −U outt , which is negative.
Consequently, this contract will not be offered. But making use of the argument
that a fixed wage does not have an influence on the worker’s effort, she sets
the minimum possible fixed wage of zero wSB1 = 0 also in the offer period and
solves the side condition of (4.5) for s1. The first period piece rate of a long-term
contract under fully flexible wages with s∗τ = 0.5 and w
∗
τ = 0 thus is:
sSB1 =
√
2c
P 2
U outt −
1
4
(τ − 1).
This contract constitutes again a second-best solution to the employer. De-
pending on the market wage in the offer period wct this contract cannot be offered
for all possible contract durations as for certain combinations sSB1 becomes larger
than unity. With the experimental parameters5, we may not accept contract du-
rations longer than τ = 6. The employer’s profit from such a contract is:
ΠSB1 = s
SB
1 (1− sSB1 )
P 2
c
+ (τ − 1)s∗τ (1− s∗τ )
P 2
c
.
An employee is in expectancy indifferent between the long-term contract and
a series of one-period contracts. But does it pay off for an employer to offer a
long-term contract? We need to compare the employer’s profit from a long-term
contract σSB1 of length τ with his profit from offering a series of τ short-term
contracts σ∗;SB to answer this question. If we make the same assumptions as in
section 4.1.3.2 for our experimental parameters the decision about which contract
to offer again depends on contract duration and the market wage in the offer
period. The inequality
ΠSB1 ≥ Π∗;SBt +
τ+t∑
n=t+1
E
(
Π∗;SBn
)
5wcn ∈ {13, 14, ..., 30}; c = 1; P = 10; T = 10.
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becomes:
√
2P√
c
(√
U outt − (τ − 1)
P 2
8c
−√wct − (τ − 1)E(√wct )
)
+ (τ − 1)P
2
2c
≥ 0.
It can be solved for wct but then becomes very elaborate and does not give
any insights about how the combinations of wct and τ have an influence on the
employer’s decision between short- and long-term contracts. Thus we look at it
in the regions of wct and τ that are relevant for our experiments. For
wct ≤ 22.65 + τ(0.28 · τ − 5.07)
the employer would prefer a long-term contract over a series of short-term
contracts6. That means, she only wants to offer a long-term contract for a
market wage in the offer period of wct = 13 that would last for two periods:
σSB1 = (0; 0.66; 2). In all other cases, the short-term contract is preferred.
For all infeasible combinations, the employer may have the possibility to offer
a first-period contract with positive lump sum payment that is accepted by the
worker and is preferred over a series of short-term contracts. As this kind of
contract offer does not result from any profit- or utility-maximizing rationale, it
is not further analyzed.
We did not analyze all possible combinations of wage adjustment, on one
hand, we did not look at those in our experiments either, on the other, because
from a theoretical view their solution depends on the flexibility of the piece rate,
thus a situation with inflexible fixed wages and upward or full flexibility of piece
rates lead to the same results as were described here respectively.
4.2 Contract Duration Experiments
The experiment was conducted at the University of Karlsruhe7. The subject
pool consists of students of different faculties. For treatments PU and PT we
had eleven sessions, for treatments N, U and T we had six sessions each. The
6Values on the right hand side are rounded.
7The experiment was run by means of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft.
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software was developed at the University of Karlsruhe (Institute WiOR), it was
set in discrete time. Each session lasted for ten periods with fixed roles of
employers and workers. That results in 400 participants in the experiment.8 In
Table 4.1 the participants’ average payoff in Euro is given:
Table 4.1: Participants’ Average Payoffs for All Treatments (Euro)
N PU U PT T
employer 18.14 14.98 13.88 13.79 18.55
employee 18.11 20.13 19.17 18.94 18.71
average 18.12 17.03 16.52 16.38 18.63
In each matching group there were five employers and five workers. In every
period participants with no given partner from an already existing contract were
randomly matched within their matching group of ten and the random and
uniformly distributed market wage was announced. Free employers offered a
contract to the worker they were matched with. This contract was accepted or
declined by the worker. If accepted, the worker chose his effort for this period, if
declined the worker got the market wage and the employer was left with nothing.
Own results and those of their partner in the respective period were shown to
participants at the end of each period and could be recalled on the screen at any
time. After all participants had made their decisions, the next period started.
For our experimental parameters9 the optimal terms of contract with myopic
players are:
σ∗;SB = (0; 0.1 ·√2wct ; 1).
For farsighted employers in treatments PU, U, N and PT it is optimal to
offer contracts with the maximum possible duration (τmax), which are accepted
by workers:
σˆ =
0; 0.1 ·√2wct + (τmax − 1)43
τmax
; τmax
 .
8Two one period contracts one from treatment PU and one from T are excluded from
the sample as workers chose the internal upper limit of effort (499). As this choice led to
detrimental losses we consider it as a fault by the participants.
9wcn ∈ {13, 14, ..., 30}; c = 1; P = 10; T = 10.
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In the treatment with full flexibility (T), the employer prefers under a market
wage of wct = 13 to offer a two-period-contract with
σSB1 = (0; 0.66; 2) .
For higher market wages, she offers short-term contracts σ∗;SB. The contracts
should be accepted by workers and lead to an effort of e∗ = 10 · s.
4.2.1 Experimental Results
In Table 4.2 a description of the experimental variables’ averages is displayed.
All averages except from effort are calculated for the periods in which a new
contract was offered. This is done to keep treatments with different rules of
wage adjustment comparable. Effort is averaged over all effort decision periods
of workers, periods with rejected contracts are omitted in that case. As the
market wage is random and not all periods are considered, its average is also
shown for all treatments.
Table 4.2: Average Experimental Results for All Treatments
N PU U PT T
market wage 21.712 22.119 21.890 20.917 20.096
fixed wage 13.039 11.449 9.667 12.075 11.718
piece rate 0.493 0.532 0.534 0.523 0.541
accepted [%] 72.0 73.1 76.8 70.7 71.8
offered duration 1.311 1.539 1.430 1.737 1.973
effort 8.000 6.466 6.506 6.568 7.695
The acceptance rate is highest for treatment U which gives workers maximum
insurance with an option to improve. Employers on average offer the lowest
contract duration with no flexibility (N) and highest with full flexibility (T). All
average efforts are higher than eˆ = 10 · s predicts. Although workers are not in
fear of a wage reduction in treatment N, their effort is on average highest for
this treatment followed by T. Average piece rates are all near 0.5, which most
probably served as a focal point.
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4.2.1.1 Offered Contract Duration
Due to the results of Section 4.1.3.2 in treatments N, PU, U and PT long-term
contracts σˆ are offered in all periods t ≤ 9. In treatment T σSB1 = (0; 0.66; 2) is
offered whenever the market wage is at its lowest possible level for t ≤ 9. With
higher market wages, a short-term contract σ∗;SB should be offered. This leads
to the hypothesis:
H1A: Offered contract duration does not differ from optimal dura-
tion.
We test H1A by applying Sign-Tests to compare offered contract duration
with maximal contract duration, which is 10−t+1 and with short-term contracts.
Wherefore we keep comparability, although the theoretical solutions vary over
treatments.
Table 4.3: Offered Contract Duration in Treatments
N PU U PT T
avg. offered duration 1.311 1.539 1.430 1.737 1.973
avg. maximal duration 5.498 5.468 5.536 5.637 5.878
avg. optimal duration q q q q 1.138
Sign-T. one-period (P) < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
Sign-T. max. duration (P) < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
Sign-T. opt. duration (P) q q q q q
As can be seen from Table 4.3, offered contract duration differs significantly
from average maximal duration as well as from one-period contracts. Employers’
contract offers lie between minimal and maximal duration except for treatment
T, where the average optimal duration is 1.138 (26 two-period- and 162 one-
period contracts). Also if we divide the samples into the first and second five
periods the picture stays the same. Further analysis shows that offered con-
tract duration is significantly shorter than possible. Recall that due to effort-
smoothing longer contract durations should be preferred in all treatments but
T. This leads to the results:
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Result A Participants in all treatments offered significantly dif-
ferent contract durations than expected, with on average shorter
contracts than possible. H1A cannot be supported.
If we compare between treatments, offered contract duration in treatment
T should be shorter than in all other treatments (compare σˆ and σSB1 ). A
behavioural interpretation of the average offered contract duration would be
that employers try to bind workers to establish a situation of reciprocity. In
treatments PT and T the employer can directly react to the worker’s effort
choice in a long-term contract. In other treatments the thread of punishment is
missing. Ergo, if the behavioural reasoning applies, offered contract duration is
higher in treatments PT and T than in N, PU and U. For building our hypothesis,
we stick to the theoretical solution:
H1B: Offered contract duration in treatment T is shorter than in the
other treatments.
Figure 4.3: Offered Contract Duration for all Treatments
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To get an overview of the offered duration in all treatments see Figure 4.3.
The fraction of one-period contracts is higher, the less flexible the terms of
contract are. To test H1B, we apply a Kruskal-Wallis One-Way ANOVA on
ranks to see if there is a significant difference between treatments regarding
offered contract duration. Although averages are quite similar, the difference
is highly significant (H=51.136; P< 0.001). To isolate the treatments which
are causing the difference, we compare pairwise using Dunn’s Method (Table
4.4). The values of the test variable Q indicate significant differences between
treatments T respective PT and all other treatments. There is no significant
difference between offered contract duration in all other treatments, also PT
and T do not differ. Figure 4.3 visualizes the differences: Most contract offers
lie in the range between one and three periods, but in treatments U, PU and N
there are fewer two and three period contracts and more one-period offers. We
also see that employers by far do not offer durations over the whole available
range.
Table 4.4: Results of Dunn’s Test on Correlation of Offered Contract Duration
Between Treatments
N PU U PT T
N no - yes yes
PU no - yes yes
U - - yes yes
PT yes yes yes no
T yes yes yes no
Result B Offered contract duration is significantly different from
the other treatments in PT and T. H1B cannot be supported: Em-
ployers want to bind workers if they can negatively reciprocate to
effort reductions.
4.2.1.2 Wages Offered
The optimal offered piece rate should depend on the market wage of the actual
period and the offered contract duration. We look at the optimality of piece rate
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offers in one-period and long-term contracts separately.
H1C: In treatments N, PU, U and PT employers offer in long-term
contracts the optimal piece rate of
s+ =
1
10
·
√
2wcn + 43 · (τ − 1)
τ
.
In treatment T they offer under wct = 13 two-period contracts
with
sSB1 = 0.66.
In one-period contracts
s∗;SB =
1
10
·√2wcn
is offered in all treatments.
As the optimal piece rate depends on contract duration and the market wage
of the offer-period, we have paired samples of actual and optimal piece rates. For
treatment T, contracts with suboptimal contract duration are excluded from this
analysis as for these there is no theoretical prediction for the piece rate (i.e., we
excluded 89 of 188 contract offers of treatment T). The Sign-Test finds significant
differences (all P-Values < 0.001) for all treatments. Also the contract offers of
one period differ significantly from the optimal behavior of a myopic employer.
As already mentioned, participants seem to take fixed wages into account and
seem to compensate low piece rates by higher than optimal fixed wage offers.
The following can be stated:
Result C Offered piece rates are significantly different from optimal
ones.
As we saw in Table 4.2 all averages of offered fixed wages are strictly greater
than zero, which differs from the prediction of zero fixed wages. The percentages
of zero fixed wage offers are: N (12.5%), PU (18.0%), U (20.7%), PT (13.5%),
and T (17.6%). They seem to be independent of the degree of flexibility. Offered
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fixed wages differ according to a Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA over treatments, but
as percentages of zero offers suggest, only treatments N and U actually differ
significantly. As piece rates are also higher than expected, positive fixed wages
cannot be explained by the theoretical model.
4.2.1.3 Acceptance of Contract Offers
After analyzing the optimality of contract offers, we look at the quality of con-
tract acceptance decisions. Workers should accept contracts that lead to an
(expected) utility at least as high as the (expected) market wage. To compare
expected utility from a contract with the expected market wage in long-term
relationships, we calculate expected utility from a contract assuming an optimal
effort choice by workers. We also take into account the different rules of wage
adjustment of the different treatments. In the following table, the equations for
expected utility from a contract are given. We calculated these assuming that
employers would not increase their wage offers even if they could, i.e. fixed wages
fall to zero if possible and the piece rate is set to 0.5.
Table 4.5: Expected Utility from a Long-term Contract
treatment expected utility
N τ(w + 50s2)
PU τ(w + 50s2)
U τ(w + 50s2)
PT w + τ50s2
T w + 50s2 + (τ − 1)12.5
H0D: Workers’ contract acceptance does not differ from optimal
acceptances.
Workers’ contract acceptances differ significantly from optimal acceptance for
all treatments except PT, where a nearly equal number of contracts is wrongly
accepted and rejected. This also results in the best match between the percent-
ages of accepted contracts. Test results are summarized in the next result:
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Result D
N PU U PT T
actual acceptance [%] 72.0 73.1 76.8 70.7 71.8
optimal acceptance [%] 87.5 88.8 89.9 69.2 62.8
P-Value(Sign-Test) < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 0.2451 0.011
These numbers also imply that for treatments N, PU and U nearly 90%
of contract offers were acceptable for workers. Nevertheless, in all treatments
only between 70% and 77% of the offers were accepted, which better suits in
treatments PT and T. An explanation of this behavior could be that workers
did not want to engage in long-term contracts in treatments where employers
have the possibility for downward adjustment of (the) wage(s).
To get a closer view of the factors that influence the workers’ decision to
accept, we ran Logit-regressions of contract acceptance on various potential de-
terminants. The results can be found in Table 4.6. We are regressing on the
probability to accept a contract. Besides, the terms of the contract (offered
duration, fixed wage and piece rate) as well as the prevailing market wage and
the relationship’s status (new random match or renewed relationship) may have
an influence on the decision. We also included treatment dummies to account
for different rules of adjustment and the offer period to see if there is learning.
The first entry of each cell represents β, the number in brackets is the according
standard deviation and the term in italics shows the P-value. If we exclude the
insignificant independent variables, the constant also becomes insignificant, but
we can determine the terms of contract, as well as the market wage and the
relationship’s status as determinants of the probability to accept a contract.
The highest positive influence has the piece rate (βpiece = 8.433), followed
by the fixed wage, all other significant independent variables seem to deter the
worker from accepting. The longer the offered contract and the higher the market
wage, the lower the probability to accept. βnewcontract shows that workers have
a lower probability to accept a contract if the employer is randomly matched,
which means that we observe some kind of trust in already known partners.
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Table 4.6: Logit Regression of Contract Acceptance β (Std.Dev.) P-Value
1 2 3 4
constant -0.909 (0.459) -0.779 (0.428) -0.842 (0.439) -0.723 (0.408)
0.047 0.069 0.055 0.077
offered duration -0.461 (0.062) -0.467 (0.062) -0.468 (0.062) -0.473 (0.062)
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
fixed wage 0.163 (0.015) 0.162 (0.014) 0.162 (0.015) 0.161 (0.014)
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
piece rate 8.410 (0.705) 8.424 (0.705) 8.421 (0.707) 8.433 (0.707)
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
new contract -0.752 (0.162) -0.770 (0.161) -0.762 (0.162) -0.779 (0.160)
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
market wage -0.143 (0.016) -0.143 (0.016) -0.141 (0.016) -0.141 (0.016)
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
PU 0.129 (0.202) 0.125 (0.202) – –
0.523 0.537
U 0.376 (0.232) 0.370 (0.231) – –
0.104 0.110
PT -0.059 (0.200) -0.064 (0.200) – –
0.767 0.748
T 0.030 (0.247) 0.028 (0.247) – –
0.904 0.910
period 0.019 (0.024) – 0.018 (0.024) –
0.429 0.456
Likelihood Ratio 337.159 336.532 332.342 331.786
P-Value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
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To go in more detail, we want to see whether the acceptance rate of long term
contracts is higher in treatments with stricter rules of adjustment with respect
to the piece rate. This leads to the hypothesis that for treatments N, PU and U
the acceptance rate of long term contracts is higher than for treatments PT and
T.
H1E: The acceptance rate of long-term contracts differs over treat-
ments.
A χ2-test shows that there is no significant difference in acceptance behavior
of workers between treatments. We state:
Result E Workers’ contract acceptance of long-term contracts can-
not be explained by fear of being exploited by the employer, as
acceptance behavior does not differ over treatments.
This also supports our regression results that there is no influence by the
treatment on the workers’ contract acceptance decision.
4.2.1.4 Effort Choice
After accepting a contract, workers choose effort. Their choice is limited to
positive values. We excluded effort choices that led to a negative payoff for the
worker as we consider these as mistakes. The second row of Table 4.7 gives
the percentage of effort choices for each treatment which is left unconsidered.
The small numbers show that nearly the whole sample remains included. The
third row shows the percentage of workers who account for negative payoffs. If
a worker chooses his effort optimally it is 10 · s and does not react on changes in
the fixed wage. Thence, the next hypothesis is:
H0F : Workers choose effort optimally.
All workers’ effort choices are compared pairwise by applying a Sign-Test to
the data of each treatment separately with the optimal effort in the respective
period, which is determined by the piece rate.
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Table 4.7: Effort Choice
N PU U PT T
number of observations 228 438 245 433 246
% with neg. payoff 3.1 2.1 1.6 1.2 2.0
% of workers with neg. payoff 20.0 14.5 10 9.1 16.7
actual effort 5.226 5.928 5.523 6.189 5.780
optimal effort 5.119 5.373 5.353 5.468 5.499
Pearson Product-Moment Corr. 0.833 0.589 0.797 0.590 0.707
P-Value < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
Sign-Test (P-Value) 0.360 < 0.001 0.0013 < 0.001 < 0.001
As can be seen from the Pearson Product-Moment correlations in Table 4.7,
the correlation between actual and optimal effort choice is positive and highly
significant. The Sign-test results show that for all treatments, except N there is
a significant difference in the distribution of actual and optimal effort, workers
exert more effort than optimal. So we can state:
Result F Workers’ effort choice in treatment N is near optimal
choice. In the other treatments workers exert higher effort than
optimal. H1F cannot be supported, except for treatment N.
To see how workers determine their effort we ran regressions of effort on
various parameters that describe the worker’s situation. The results can be
found in Table 4.8.
Both wages have a significantly positive influence on the workers’ effort deci-
sion. There seems to be some kind of learning: As shown in Table 4.7, workers
exert higher effort than optimal but here we find a negative time trend, which
means that the high efforts seem to result from earlier periods of the game. We
included a last contract period dummy to isolate end-game effects, but they do
not seem to occur as well as the effort decision is not influenced by the market
wage, which could serve as a reference wage. The only treatment-dummy that is
significant in the first regression becomes insignificant after excluding the afore
mentioned variables. This result is not surprising as effort choice depends op-
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Table 4.8: Multiple Linear Regression of Effort β (Std.Dev.) P-Value
1 2 3
constant 4.883 (1.836) 4.973 (1.529) 3.951 (1.388)
0.008 0.001 0.004
fixed wage 0.059 (0.028) 0.066 (0.027) 0.063 (0.026)
0.037 0.013 0.016
piece rate 8.184 (1.958) 8.434 (1.905) 8.193 (1.900)
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001
period -0.398 (0.104) -0.407 (0.103) -0.412 (0.103)
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001
PU -1.839 (0.925) -1.801 (0.921) –
0.047 0.051
U -1.560 (1.038) -1.520 (1.036) –
0.133 0.143
PT -1.565 (0.932) -1.515 (0.923) –
0.093 0.101
T -0.521 (1.056) -0.463 (1.036) –
0.622 0.655
market wage 0.027 (0.056) – –
0.629
last contract period dummy -0.389 (0.655) – –
0.553
R2 0.0252 0.0249 0.0215
adjusted R2 0.0197 0.0206 0.0197
timally just on the piece rate. We did not include contract duration to avoid
multicolinearity with the last contract period dummy. Also if we replace the
dummy with offered contract duration, the influence is insignificant. Unfortu-
nately these results have to be handeled with caution as we have a very low
R2.
Next, we come to contractual changes and their influence on effort. In a long-
term contract the only possibility for a worker to react to a change in terms of
contract is to adjust effort. Thereupon, only in treatments T and U effort should
change as workers should only consider a piece rate change in their effort choice.
In all other treatments the piece rate cannot be changed by the employer.
CHAPTER 4. LONG-TERM CONTRACTS AND EFFORT 107
H0G: There is no correlation between piece rate and effort choice in
treatment U and T.
The Pearson Product-Moment correlation between changes of the piece rate
and changes in effort in treatments U and T is positive (0.236 and 0.036) but
insignificant (P=0.111 and P=0.708 respectively). Workers do not adjust effort
to a change in the piece rate to the same degree if we look at the actual changes.
If we only look at directional changes (positive or negative adjustments) applying
the Spearman-correlation we find positive and significant correlations for both
treatments U and T (Sp.-corr.: 0.262 (P=0.008) and 0.665 (P< 0.001)). Hence,
workers reply to increases of the piece rate with higher effort and to decreases
with lower effort and act to a certain degree according to the theoretical solution.
The result is as follows:
Result G Workers in long-term contracts of treatment U and T
react to changes in the piece rate with a change in effort of the
same sign. H0G can be rejected.
As we already found that workers on average exert higher effort than optimal
in all but two treatments and that optimality only depends on the piece rate,
we also want to look at changes of the fixed wage as those could be another
influencing factor in the workers’ effort decisions. To keep comparability, we
now look at changes in worker utility resulting from a change in the terms of
contract. We want to find out if the worker still exerted the same effort as in
the previous period. We differentiate between long-term contracts and renewed
contracts. Renewed contracts are defined as a voluntary relationship of more
than one contract.
H0H: There is no causal dependence between a change in workers’
utility from one period to the next and changes in effort for long-
term as well as for renewed contracts.
We ran linear regressions of utility changes on effort changes to identify causal
relationships (Table 4.9). For all treatments except PU and both long-term
and renewed contracts, the constant is insignificant. For renewed contracts an
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Table 4.9: Regression of Effort on Utility β (Std.Dev.) P-Value
long-term N PU U PT T
constant - 0.179 0.023 -0.061 0.056
(0.062) (0.085) (0.058) (0.069)
0.775 0.791 0.298 0.416
utility - 0.222 0.135 0.039 0.388
(0.146) (0.155) (0.070) (0.082)
0.130 0.387 0.582 <0.001
R2 - 0.017 0.012 0.002 0.171
adj. R2 - 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.163
renewed N PU U PT T
constant -0.087 -0.050 -0.048 0.082 -0.024
(0.060) (0.040) (0.052) (0.051) (0.061)
0.152 0.209 0.359 0.108 0.689
utility 0.435 0.455 0.308 0.238 0.374
(0.085) (0.055) (0.068) (0.056) (0.070)
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
R2 0.229 0.208 0.126 0.063 0.166
adj. R2 0.220 0.205 0.120 0.060 0.160
increase in utility significantly increases exerted effort for all treatments, for
long-term contracts this effect is only prevalent for treatment T. But as again,
the R2 is very low, we are not able to draw any conlusions from these regressions.
Result H H0H cannot be rejected.
In real life we observe few wage cuts in long-term relationships, although
employers need to adjust employment to market movements (Bewley (1998) and
Agell and Bennmarker (2007)). Their only possibility would be to substitute
long-term contracts by recontracting with already known workers. Table 4.10
shows the percentages of short- and long-term contracts offered and accepted.
The rate of acceptance of long-term contracts is always lower than that of short-
term contracts. The more flexibility an employer has in adjusting wages, the
more long-term contracts are offered. This also corresponds to Result A.
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Table 4.10: Short- and Long-term Contracts
N PU U PT T
short-term offered 76.7 74.3 75.1 62.9 53.7
- thereof accepted 77.2 77.5 80.3 78.9 78.2
long-term offered 23.3 25.7 24.9 37.1 46.3
- thereof accepted 55.0 60.4 66.1 56.8 64.4
renewed of all offered 22.3 28.8 34.3 27.4 18.6
only one partner wants renewal 52.1 41.5 41.8 39.1 50.0
- thereof only employer 45.9 56.2 65.2 69.6 87.3
Participants contract renewal behavior is different over treatments (χ2-Test)
as well as they are offering long-term contracts to a different extent. This is also
reflected in Result B.
Employers should offer a new contract to a worker if the match was successful,
i.e. if they had positive profits. Workers should also opt for rematching, if their
experience with the respective employers was positive.
H0I: Agreement to rematching is independent of the participants’
payoffs.
We again used the χ2-test to see whether opting for rematching is independent
of the payoff to both types of players. For employers, this decision depends on
the period’s payoff, for workers there is only a dependency in treatments PU and
PT.
Result I Employers opt for rematching if their payoff from the
match was positive, in workers’ behavior there is only an interde-
pendence for treatments PU and PT.
4.2.2 Summary of Experimental Results
On the employers’ side, offered contract duration is increasing with the flexibility
of contracts. The less strict the rules to wage adjustment are, the more long-term
contracts are offered. As market wage is stochastic, employers incur with long-
term contracts the risk of not being able to profit from low market wages and thus
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offer shorter contracts the less flexible a contract can be designed. Employers’
contract offers are more generous than expected: Except for treatment T, piece
rates are on average around 0.5 and are significantly higher than optimal piece
rates.
Workers’ contract acceptance does not differ between treatments. But long
contract durations and high market wages in the offer period deter them from
accepting a contract. Piece rates are the main criterion to accept and the prob-
ability to accept an offered contract decreases in later periods. Compared to
optimal contract acceptance, workers accept fewer contracts, which is, they de-
cline contracts with a higher expected utility than they had in the same number
of periods with the expected market wage. Employers’ high piece rate offers
are rewarded with higher than optimal effort choices. That means, when an
employer offers a high piece rate she is rewarded by even higher effort than
would correspond to this piece rate. Accordingly, there is reciprocal behavior by
workers.
When it comes to renewed contracts, we observe a higher probability to
accept a contract offer. Workers seem to start trusting to an already known em-
ployer which makes them accept their contracts more often than those of newly
matched employers. Employers opt for rematching if their gain was positive
and workers do so for a positive utility except for treatment T. Maybe workers
do not want to depend on the same employer when she has full flexibility of
wage adjustment. Nevertheless, the afore mentioned higher acceptance rate in
rematched pairs does not differ between treatments.
4.3 Conclusion
In theory as well as in our experiments, long-term employment was possible in
two ways: Partners could either conclude long-term contracts or mutually agree
to rematching. The theoretical model predicted only differences between the
completely flexible treatment and the other treatments with some inflexibilities
to wage adjustment in an existing contract. In the experiments we observed
shorter contracts the more restricted the situation was. This corresponds to
the empirical study by Bewley (1998) and the data from EuroStat mentioned in
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the introduction: Participants seemed to be more sensitive to regulations than
theoretically expected. But in the treatments of the experiment they also had the
possibility of a long-term relationship by recontracting and thus, circumventing
regulations. Nonetheless, offered contract duration, effort levels, and opting for
rematching varied significantly over treatments.
We further observed reciprocity on the part of workers: High wage offers were
rewarded with even higher efforts. Here the results of Agell and Bennmarker
(2007) and Bewley (1998) from manager enquiries are supported: They stated
that the main reason for stable wages during a recession is the fear of workers
punishing falling wages with lower effort. The theoretical coherence between
piece rate and effort is supported by our data, but the response is more intense
than expected. In contrast to the managers of Bewley’s survey, employers in the
experiment decrease wages and are thus punished by lower efforts.
It seems that the complex concept of effort smoothing does not influence
employers and workers in their decisions, but they seem to be influenced by
behavioral guidelines they take from everyday life. Thus, the theoretical predic-
tions are only a benchmark to predict behavior which is qualitatively met, but
quantitatively actual behavior is more extreme.
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4.4 Appendix
The following instructions are for treatment PU and translated from German.
For other treatments they differed according to the descriptions of section 4.1.2.2.
Instructions
In this experiment you can earn money which will be paid to you at the end
of the experiment in cash. The experiment lasts 10 periods. How much you
will earn depends on your and the decisions of other participants. Every par-
ticipant decides isolated at his computer terminal. Communication with other
participants is not allowed.
Participants are randomly assigned to the roles of an employer (AG) or a
worker (AN). You get to know your role at the beginning and keep it during the
whole experiment.
Every participant has an initial endowment of 150 GE (currency units).
Run of the Experiment
At the beginning of each period the period’s market wage M in GE is announced
to all group members. At this wage, every worker is employed if not contracted
otherwise with an employer. Only the market wage of the present period is
known, all future market wages are unknown. Every employer is matched with
one worker and offers a work contract to him. This contract consists of a fixed
wage, the contract duration and the worker’s fraction of the produced
quantity. Every worker can accept or decline his contract. If he accepts the
contract, the worker chooses the production quantity. Employers and workers
are paid according to the concluded contract. At the end of a contract, employers
and workers are asked whether they want to interact again with the same person
in the next period. If both agree, they are matched again in the next period.
Run of the First Period
1. The random market wage for the present period is announced. The market
wage can assume integers from 13 to 30.
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2. Employer-worker pairs are matched randomly.
3. The employer offers a contract. The contract consists of the following:
• A fixed wage F in GE with F ≥ 0.
• A fraction a with 0 ≤ a ≤ 1 of the production quantity for the worker.
• The contract duration L, which is an integer with 1 ≤ L ≤ number
of remaining periods.
4. Workers see the contract “their” employer offers, and decide if they want
to accept this contract or not. If not accepted, the worker gets the market
wage and the employer gets a return of zero.
5. If the contract is accepted, the worker chooses the production quantity Q
which is sold for 10 GE. The division of the production quantity is given
by a.
The return to the worker from an accepted contract in this period is:
F + 10 · aQ− 1/2 ·Q2
The employer’s return in this case is:
10 · (1− a)Q− F
If the worker declines the contract, he gets the market wage. The employer
is left with a return of zero.
6. Earnings of the period and the sum of all period’s returns are shown in
GE on the computer screen.
Run of Later Periods
For participants who are not yet in a long-term contract, the run of a period is
like the first period. The offered contract duration in this case may not be larger
than the number of remaining periods. The employer of a pair in a long-term
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contract is allowed to increase the fixed wage after the period’s market wage is
announced. Then all workers choose their production quantity Q.
If a contract ends, employer and worker in this pair are asked whether they
want to be matched again with the same partner in the next period. If both
agree, the pair can conclude a new contract in the next period. Otherwise, both
are randomly assigned to new partners.
In a long-term contract the worker’s fraction of the production quantity and
the contract duration do not change, while the fixed wage can be increased by the
employer in every period. A contract with a changed fixed wage is automatically
accepted, but the worker chooses the production quantity every period anew.
“History”
During the experiment you can at any time call your “history” by pressing the
button at the lower bound of your computer screen or the key F1. The following
information for previous periods is given in the history: period, market wage,
fixed wage, fraction AN, duration, acceptance, quantity, return AG, and return
AN. Duration is here the number of contract periods left.
Payment
You are paid at the end of the experiment. The return of all periods are added
and converted into Euros with a conversion rate of 0.05 Euro per GE. Payment
is anonymously.
Questionnaire
Before the experiment starts, you will be asked some questions on the computer
screen about the rules of the experiment. If you do not understand any of the
questions, please ask the experimenter.
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Summary of Notation
a worker’s fraction of production quantity, 0 ≤ a ≤ 1
F fixed wage, 0 ≤ F ≤ 60
L contract duration, 1 ≤ L ≤ number of remaining periods
M market wage, M ∈ 13, 14, ..., 30
Q production quantity, 0 ≤ Q ≤ ...
GE currency units
AN worker
AG employer
Chapter 5
Summary and Conclusion
This thesis discussed different aspects of a work relationship: On one hand, we
looked at selection problems when workers differ in their intrinsic work motiva-
tion as well as in their qualification, on the other, we investigated the effects of
contractual flexibility on contract duration.
At first, in Chapter 2, a motivating real-effort experiment showed, that a
worker’s qualification does not fully describe all of his characteristics, that are
relevant to a work relationship and that there may be other, unobservable char-
acteristics besides qualification. At the beginning of the experiment worker-
participants chose their level of qualification (their productivity) by themselves.
After concluding a (complete) contract with an employer-participant, they ex-
erted effort although remuneration was lump sum and independent of their be-
havior. Thus, we found participants to act intrinsically motivated in a labor
market setting with another participant instead of the experimenter being the
contract partner.
In the theoretical model of Chapter 3, agents’ work motivation was intro-
duced into a standard utility function. Intrinsic work motivation is assumed to
be innate, hence agents cannot choose the degree of intrinsic motivation. What
they are able to choose, is their level of qualification. They do this by deciding in
favour of or against taking part in costly qualification measures. As their result-
ing skill-level is observable to principals, they screen with respect to motivation
knowing the endogenously chosen skill type of the worker. With continuously dis-
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tributed motivation, investing into qualification is preferred either by all or none
of the motivational types. The investment decision is independent of motivation
as we assume principals not to update their beliefs regarding the distribution
of motivated agents on a certain skill-level. A principal optimizes her contract
offer, assuming the initial distribution of motivation for both skill-levels.
With discrete motivational levels (motivated and unmotivated) and princi-
pals knowing the actual distribution of motivational types on both skill-levels,
there is shut-down of unmotivated agents when their fraction at the respective
skill-level becomes to low, as the low chance of meeting them does not justify
offering an information rent for the motivated agents. For higher fractions of
unmotivated agents, employers are willing to incur these cost, as the probability
to be left without an accepted contract outweighs these. This result is quite rare
in screening-models. Still there is an incentive for motivated agents to invest into
high qualification as this increases their information rent whenever the fraction
of unmotivated agents in both skill groups is equal. Unmotivated agents are,
irrespective of their skill-level, the “bad types” in this screening game and thus
receive always just their outside option. But as investment costs are a fraction of
future wages, becoming high-skilled is also affordable to unmotivated agents and
they are indifferent regarding qualification. Thus, motivated agents’ return from
investing decreases with an increasing rate of qualification in the population.
We showed that an educational system with qualification cost depending
on the wage, as the German BaFo¨G, leads to higher overall qualification and
hence, to increased efficiency. This result is independent of the assumption of
a motivational term in the utility function and occurs whenever workers differ
in two independent dimensions, where one is naturally given and unobservable
(like the ability to work in a team) and the other is at the worker’s choice and
observable to a prospective employer (like taking part in productivity enhancing
measures).
In Chapter 4, a different situation with homogenous workers but incomplete
contracts is introduced. Instead of contracting on wage and quantity, employers
offer a combination of lump sum wage and piece rate for a certain number of pe-
riods. Workers who accepted a contract, afterwards choose effort in every period
of the existing contract. At the end of the last contract period both partners
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were able to opt for rematching, which was accomplished, if both wanted to.
The worker’s outside option was a stochastically determined market wage. In
theory, as well as in the experiment, we looked at different degrees of contractual
wage flexibility: With downward fixed piece rates it is optimal for both partners
to conclude long-term contracts, as the worker is insured against low market
wages and the employer profits from effort-smoothing. With flexible piece rates,
this insurance character vanishes and employers cannot count on positive efforts
by workers. Thus, in this treatment of our experiment at most two-period con-
tracts should be offered. Referring to the empirical results of Bewley (1999),
in the experiment we expected long-term contracts in situations with downward
adjustable wages to be replaced by series of short-term contracts. What we ob-
serve, is that only the relation of short- to long-term contracts offered decreases
with increasing flexibility: There are no significant differences over treatments
in opting for rematching. Wages higher than optimal are rewarded with high
efforts. The reciprocal interdependencies seem to rule the work-relationship.
Coming back to the title question, “What is good work?”, we were able to
identify working conditions that at least do not have a negative effect on intrinsic
work motivation, by analyzing the psychological literature. In the motivation
experiment we also found that an interesting and diversified task can lead to
high effort although payment is independent of performance.
Employers would characterize a good job by high effort, combined with low
wage claims. In the screening models, workers could be separated regarding
those characteristics but we saw in the motivation screening with only two levels
of motivation (unmotivated and motivated) that selection is not always most
profitable to the employer. The selection mechanisms improved the situation of
both contractual parties when information asymmetries could not be overcome
otherwise.
In the experiments of Chapter 4 we saw, that an employer-worker-relationship
is determined and influenced by more than just contractual facts and selfish
rationality. The partner with the first move was rewarded for trusting in the
second mover. Trust was given in the form of offering a positive lump sum wage
under non-contractible effort, it was reciprocated by higher effort than justified
by the piece rate. In most cases, this deviation from optimal behavior improved
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the profits of both partners as it increased the set of enforceable outcomes,
compared to both acting purely selfish. These results are in line with Fehr,
Ga¨chter, and Kirchsteiger (1997) who experimentally tested work relationships
with incomplete contracts on reciprocal behavior by the employee and found a
large potential for efficiency gains, when contracts allow for trust and reciprocity.
We found that also under incomplete contracting, employees seldomly exploit the
situation that their effort is not contractible.
If we want to define “good work” for both, employers and workers, we can
state that a contract that suits the employee’s characteristics and takes into
account the informational situation, is able to overcome the conflicting interests
to guarantee a high degree of satisfaction for both sides: “Good work” is the
result of a good contract.
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